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by filmgirlcw
526 days ago
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I think as Ricky wrote last week [1], they should augment Magic Links or other auth methods. There are some positives about Magic Links for sure (though I don't know if making your email an even stronger attack vector is necessarily one of them), but for people who use a password manager, for example, they are a definite friction point that I think passkeys most certainly could alleviate. There are definite UX problems around passkeys that could be improved and I think exporting will make syncing across systems a lot better (one of the reasons I use 1Password as my primary password and passkey system is so I can use my passkeys across devices; of course it helps that my employer uses 1Password as our system so I am logged into my personal and enterprise accounts and can auth then from personal or work devices, provided additional auth or enrollment isn't needed) -- but if the problem as 404 defines it is that they don't want to be responsible or even have to worry about storing your passwords/auth controls, I think passkeys is at least better for a subset of users than Magic Links. But again, like Ricky, I don't think it should be viewed as either or. It should be both. [1]: https://rmondello.com/2025/01/02/magic-links-and-passkeys/ |
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> though I don't know if making your email an even stronger attack vector is necessarily one of them
I'm unconvinced that magic links do make your email an even stronger attack vector. Essentially every service that would be inclined to use magic links would already have a way to reset your password entirely once the email is compromised. All magic links do is make this the primary way to interact with the auth flow.
The bad guys already know that your email is the best target. Magic links just make that very explicit.