[s1artibartfast]

Maybe Im reiterating the same point as you, but the experiment is an illustration of distinction between understanding and performance. Size of the model or perfect performance does not negate the distinction.

IMO, the line of thinking in the metaphor is contingent on unanswered questions about self-awareness, which seems to be a definitional prerequisite for semantic understanding.

[fragmede]

If we hypothesis perfect performance, the philosophical question is if that's a distinction without (or with) a difference. Perfect performance would simulate semantic understanding, no? More relevant to the real world though, how do we rate imperfect performance? If a Chinese Room that I have access to can make some logical leaps but not others, how do we rate this artificial intelligence? We have words to describe humans with insufficient semantic understanding but they are not usually able to write/generate cromulent essays on basically every topic.

[s1artibartfast]

>Perfect performance would simulate semantic understanding, no?

The thought experiment argues the exact opposite. The idea is you can have perfect Chinese but not understand a single word of what you are saying. The argument is that syntax (procedure based operation) and semantics (understanding) are distinct and separable.

As you extend the scope of the Chinese room from a single task (e.g. Chinese conversation) to human behavior in general, it converges with the question of if philosophical zombies can exist.

In terms of the Chinese room, the distinction IS the difference.

[fragmede]

That's what Searle's argument is, but it's a thought experiment and there's no consensus among professional philosophers as to whether or not to believe it is true.