[joshghent]

Despite people slating the author, I think this is a reasonable oversight. On the surface, spinning up a Postgres instance in Docker seems secure because it’s contained. I know many articles claim “Docker= Secure”.

Whilst easy to point to common sense needed, perhaps we need to have better defaults. In this case, the Postgres images should only permit the cli, and nothing else.

[Fnoord]

Every guide out there says to link Postgres to the application (the one using Postgres). So the Postgres network is not reachable. Then, even if it were exposed, a firewall would need to be configured to allow access. Then, another thing every guide does is suggesting a reverse proxy, decreasing attack service. Then, such reverse proxy would need some kind of authentication. Instead, I simply run it behind Wireguard. There's still plenty to go wrong, such as backdoor in Postgres database image (you used docker pull), not upgrading it while it contains serious vulnerabilities, or a backdoor in some other image.

[lopkeny12ko]

> spinning up a Postgres instance in Docker seems secure because it’s contained

This doesn't make any sense. Running something in a container doesn't magically make it "secure." Where does this misconception come from?

[diggan]

> Where does this misconception come from?

When docker first appeared, a lot of people explaining docker to others said something along the lines "It's like a fast VM you can create with a Dockerfile", leading a bunch of people to believe it's actually not just another process + some more stuff, but instead an actual barrier between host/guest like in a proper VM.

I remember talking about this a lot when explaining docker to people in the beginning, and how they shouldn't use it for isolation, but now after more than a decade with that misconception still being popular, I've lost energy about it...