[lproven]

I honestly don't know.

It seems to me that the field lacks a solid definition of what consciousness is. Merely defining it seems to be the core of "the hard problem".

https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/

If the field accepts that it can't describe or define what consciousness is then any competent practitioner in that field will go out of their way to avoid saying that an entity, or class of entities -- such as LLM bots -- do not possess it.

To do anything else would be to lay themselves open to attack. It would be a career-threatening move.

Not being able to say "this type of software is not conscious" makes it necessary to beat around the bush somewhat in trying to say what amounts to "this type of software cannot think".

I don't know what you perceive as "woolly" here, but it could be due to that.

[Vecr]

The person who defined the Hard Problem researches LLMs and is a lot less woolly about it.

Being woolly isn't the best that can be done if others are making actual arguments, the kind that aren't in the article.

[lproven]

David Chalmers?

Can you give some specific examples of what you consider wooliness in the article?

[Vecr]

Yes, David Chalmers.

For the article itself, phrases like "a naïve and toxic view" and "a debased version of what we are" are statements that need to be strongly backed up.

"For me, thinking is a specific and rather unique set of experiences we have." yes, okay, but what experiences?

What do you mean by "concepts"?

She talks about behaviorist reactions, but fails to back that up at all. Why does she think e.g. mechanistic interp. is behaviorist?

"there’s nothing on the other side participating in this communication." I think this is currently correct, for some definition of "nothing", but give an argument.

"new moral claims in the world" give a good physics-based account of this process in humans.

But this efficiency, Vallor continues, “is never defined with any reference to any higher value, which always slays me. Because I could be the most efficient at burning down every house on the planet, and no one would say, ‘Yay Shannon, you are the most efficient pyromaniac we have ever seen! Good on you!’” -- ever heard of E/ACC?

"Vallor tells me she once tried to explain to an AGI leader that there’s no mathematical solution to the problem of justice." -- not currently, but this is peak woolly. Maybe she doesn't know it, but a mathematical solution would need to contain incredibly horrible things. If you stay away from the math, you can avoid thinking about that sort of thing.

Mainly though, it's what the article does not contain. That's tricky to enumerate. I can try if you want.

[lproven]

I think I'm out.

I do not find the argument that the Hard Problem is a problem convincing. I don't think it's hard or even really a problem; it's people arguing about Peano derivations when discussing how many angels are dancing on the heads of how many pins.

It's irrelevant and it's not just missing the point, it's actively spreading smoke clouds around the area of the point so that nobody can see it any more.

For me, Douglas Adams nailed philosophy:

« It is often said that a disproportionate obsession with purely academic or abstract matters indicates a retreat from the problems of real life. However, most of the people engaged in such matters say that this attitude is based on three things: ignorance, stupidity, and nothing else. Philosophers, for example, argue that they are very much concerned with the problems posed by real life. Like, for instance, “what do we mean by real?”, and “how can we reach an empirical definition of life?”, and so on. »

I recognise that some people find these issues significant and important. I do not. If that's what interests you, I have nothing more to contribute.

[Vecr]

I'm not saying I disagree. If a philosopher rejects the Hard Problem, they need to come out and say it, especially if they are disagreeing with the computer scientists and Turing.

That's not the most usual position.