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by gadtfly
540 days ago
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See also the Mark 14 torpedo, the primary American torpedo in WWII, which didn't actually work for the first 2 years of the war because they had never bothered to actually test it because it would be too expensive. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo |
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Specifically, they didn't want to waste 1-10 torpedoes for testing, which maybe that can be defensible, but it became utterly indefensible when every single submarine came back from patrol with reports of "we launched a spread of 4 torps, 2 hit the hull of the enemy ship, zero detonations".
The lost value in un-sunk enemy shipping, the number of dead seaman that should have come back victorious, the number of subs that got sunk after an attack utterly failed, all were individually prices that dwarfed a single Mk14 torpedo, and together had a measurable impact on war performance.
All because the bureau of ordinance basically refused to hear any feedback.
Nearly every single component of the torpedo was unfit for service. The magnetic exploder didn't work. The contact detonator was nearly incapable of working because of the physics of torpedo impacts in a way that meant getting a perpendicular hit, which was considered optimal, actually was less likely to detonate. The depth keeping system was calibrated incorrectly, due to module integration mistakes, and ran 10 feet deeper than it was supposed to in some cases.
It's actually kind of common for US military procurement to produce a somewhat failed piece of equipment initially, but it usually gets modified and iterated on and improved to the point of being very respectable hardware in short order. The refusal of BuOrd to hear feedback is the real problem here. Their insane delays in fielding and responding to feedback cost real US lives. Once the torpedo was fixed up, the American sub fleet in the pacific ran roughshod over Japanese supply and utterly crippled their abilities to maintain control over the island chains.
The reason BuOrd gave for refusing to double check their work as these scathing reports came in? You see, the navy was struggling to produce enough torpedoes to meet requirements, so we can't waste a couple for testing. Instead, HUNDREDS of outright non-functioning torpedoes were sent to the bottom of the pacific, completely wasted, with almost no hope of actually working, because they were never tested.
The entire situation should be required reading for anyone in management, anywhere. Textbook case of penny smart, pound foolish.