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by margalabargala
560 days ago
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I agree with your initial argument about why we aren't Boltzmann brains, but I don't think that the same argument follows regarding the simulation hypothesis. A simulation would imply a set of rules being set up, of which your senses, and the reality they experience, are an emergent property. That is, there are rules, and your senses are generally consistent with whatever they are. With a Boltzmann brain, there's no reason whatsoever to think that any senses are consistent from one moment to the next or that any action can predictably yield any reaction. It would all just be random. |
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But then, if we conclude that we must be a BB, there is no reason for the physics of the universe in which this BB exists to be the same as the physics of the universe we experience. Hence, the argument breaks down, because BB are only very likely in the 'simulated universe', but have no reason to be in the 'real universe' (which has no reason to abide by the same laws of physics).
In other words, the assumption that we are a BB, because they are so much more likely, invalidates the argument that BBs are much more likely.