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by wyldfire
565 days ago
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> ensuring system integrity The threat model here is defective hardware and not an attacker? Presumably an attacker with RCE could just make "more" activity via the verification path in order to accomplish their goals. Although I suppose this activity would be present in the tree, so you could conceivably audit it (somehow) and discover the attack. |
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1. Hardware integrity: Yes, it helps detect hardware faults, but that's not the primary focus.
2. Attack detection and auditing: The system creates an un-forgeable chain of evidence for all operations. An attacker with RCE could indeed create "legitimate" operations, but:
- Each operation is cryptographically signed and chained
- Operations must maintain valid state transitions
- The Merkle tree structure makes it impossible to modify past operations
- Anomaly detection can flag suspicious operation patterns
3. Runtime verification: The system enforces invariants at runtime. For example:
- Memory operations must maintain zone integrity
- File operations must preserve filesystem consistency
- Process transitions must follow valid state changes
It's technically true that the attacked could theoretically use the verification subsystem itself, but this creates what we call "high-fidelity forensics" - every action leaves cryptographic evidence. Think of it like a tamper-evident seal - you can't break in without leaving proof.
The code in verification.rs and operation_proofs.rs demonstrates these security mechanisms if you're interested in the implementation details of the verification as a whole.