[salutis]

macOS is a proprietary binary blob, remotely controlled by Apple. So, the light in the menu bar is not a reliable indicator of anything. There is no privacy on macOS, nor any other proprietary system. You can never be 100% sure what the system is doing right now, as can be anything it is capable of. Apple is putting a lot of money to "teach people" otherwise, but that is marketing, not truth.

[lxgr]

> There is no privacy on macOS, nor any other proprietary system.

Nor is there on any free system for which you didn't make every hardware component yourself, as well as audit the executable of the compiler with which you compiled every executable. (You did self-compile everything, hopefully?)

[lmm]

> Nor is there on any free system for which you didn't make every hardware component yourself, as well as audit the executable of the compiler with which you compiled every executable.

If the components follow standards and have multiple independent implementations, you can be reasonable confident it's not backdoored in ways that would require cooperation across the stack. At least you raise the cost bar a lot. Whereas for a vertically integrated system, made by a company headquartered in a jurisdiction with a national security law that permits them to force companies to secretly compromise themselves, the cost of compromise is so low that it would be crazy to think it hasn't been done.

[kergonath]

> You did self-compile everything, hopefully?

Including the compiler, of course.

[lxgr]

That's where things get circular, which is why I wrote "audit the compiler". But then, how much can you really trust your hex editor... :)

[joemag]

The root of all trust is eventually some human, or group of humans. See "Reflections on Trusting Trust." At least so far, Apple has convinced me that they are both willing and competent enough to maintain that trust.

[salutis]

Myself, I stopped trusting Apple. There are now too many dark patterns in their software, especially once one stops using their services. And, DRM was re-instantiated, when iTunes started streaming as Apple Music. On top of that, their lies, such as those about the Butterfly keyboards being fixed, cost me a fortune. They fuck up the keyboard design, and then they buy the computer back for 40% of its original price, due to a microscopic scratch nobody else could see. And that happened twice to me. They put a lot of money into advertising themselves as being ethical, but that is only marketing. These, of course, are my personal opinions.

[vanchor3]

> DRM was re-instantiated, when iTunes started streaming as Apple Music

Purchased music is DRM free. Streaming music was never DRM free, since you arguably do not "own" music that you have not purchased. Though I'm sure record labels would love if they could get DRM back on purchased music again.

[TZubiri]

I get it, free software take, nothing new.

But this is a pretty extremist take. Just because a company doesn't push source code and you can't deterministically have 100% certainty, doesn't mean you can't make any assertions about the software.

To refuse to make any claims about software without source is as principled as it is lazy.

Imagine an engineer brought to a worksite, and they don't have blueprints, can he do no work at all? Ok, good for you, but there's engineers that can.

[salutis]

Yes, I think all devices packed with sensors that live in our homes should be transparent in what they do, that is their code should be available for everyone to see. And yes, it is extremist take, given where we ended up today.

[kasey_junk]

It’s even dumber than that because the people that do assurance work don’t rely solely on source even when it’s available.

Reversing the software is table stakes for assurance work already so suggesting source is a requirement just doesn’t match reality.

[perching_aix]

> There is no privacy on macOS, nor any other proprietary system.

Which is to say, every system in actual widespread use. All such CPUs, GPUs, storage devices, displays, etc. run closed microcode and firmware. It'd be funny if it wasn't so profoundly sad.

And even if they didn't, the silicon design is again, closed. And even if it wasn't closed, it's some fab out somewhere that manufactures it into a product for you. What are you gonna do, buy an electron microscope, etch/blast it layer by layer, and inspect it all the way through? You'll have nothing by the end. The synchrotron option isn't exactly compelling either.

[salutis]

Yes, ultimately, I want everything to be open. This is not a bag of rice. These are devices packed with sensors, in our homes. As for inspection, I do not have a problem trusting others. I just do not trust big corporations with remotely controlled binary blobs, no matter how much money they put into the safety and security ads. This is a personal opinion, of course.

[perching_aix]

> As for inspection, I do not have a problem trusting others. I just do not trust big corporations with remotely controlled binary blobs

I'll just highlight this excerpt of your own words for you, and usher you to evaluate whether your position is even internally consistent.

[j16sdiz]

(not OP) Don't think that is inconsistent.

Trusting someone doing the right thing when you purchase is different from trusting them not tampering things remotely in the future. Companies can change management, human can change their mind. The time factor is important

[perching_aix]

Hardware can be and is implemented such that it changes behavior over time too, or have undisclosed remote capabilities. There are also fun features where various fuses blow internally if you do specific things the vendor doesn't fancy.

There sure is a difference in threat model, but I don't think the person I was replying to appreciates that, which is kind of what triggered my reply.

[salutis]

Why do you think my stance is internally inconsistent?

For example, I completely trust Emacs maintainers, as I have yet to see any malice or dark patterns coming from them. The same applies to other free and open source software I use on a daily basis. These projects respect my privacy, have nothing to hide, and I have no problem trusting them.

On the other hand, I see more and more dark patterns coming from Apple, say when signed out of their cloud services. They pour millions into their privacy ads, but I do not trust them to act ethically, especially when money is on the table.

Does this not make sense?

[perching_aix]

Thinking about it, I might have misunderstood what you wrote a bit. What I read was that you trust people, but then you also don't. That's not really a fair reading of what you wrote.

That being said, I have seen "patterns" with open source software as well, so I'm hesitant to agree on trusting it. But that's a different problem.

I also know how little hardware, microcode and firmware can be trusted, so that doesn't help either.

[salutis]

Thank you for the clarification. I certainly could have worded my comment better. I agree with you on that we should never trust open-source software blindly. That said, we can at least audit it, along with every new patch, which is impossible with binary blobs. That is why, I personally think, open-source should be preferred, for free and non-free software alike.

[kergonath]

> I just do not trust big corporations with remotely controlled binary blobs

Only outstanding individuals such as Jia Tan.

[epistasis]

Once malware is installed, the proprietary blobs from my hardware vendor are the least of my concerns. Thus my request for hardware.

[james_marks]

You can watch network traffic for data leaving the device. Trust but verify.

[3eb7988a1663]

For something as compressible as voice, I do not know how you would feel confident that data was not slipping through. Edge transcription models (eg Whisper) are continuing to get better, so it would be possible for malware to send a single bit if a user says a trigger word.

[lxgr]

Good luck auditing even just a single day of moderately active web browsing.

[kube-system]

It's easier than reading all of the code in Ubuntu.

[lxgr]

But still entirely impossible. So does it matter?

[perching_aix]

Network traffic monitoring is routinely done at enterprises. It's usually part-automated using the typical approaches (rules and AI), and part-manual (via a dedicated SOC team).

There are actual compromises caught this way too, it's not (entirely) just for show. A high-profile example would be Kaspersky catching a sophisticated data exfiltration campaign at their own headquarters: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1f6YyH62jFE

So it is definitely possible, just maybe not how you imagine it being done.

[lxgr]

I do believe that it sometimes works, but it's effectively like missile defense: Immensely more expensive for the defender than for the attacker.

If the attacker has little to lose (e.g. because they're anonymous, doing this massively against many unsuspecting users etc.), the chance of them eventually succeeding is almost certain.