[st-keller]

Sad state of affairs - this is so messed up. No trust anywhere! I’m senior Software Architect in Germany and some years ago we built an app that handles highly confidential tax-related data. And we did everything to stick to the highest standards: Strong encryption, distribution of keys and data into different datacenter operated by different companies, protocols of deletion of data, implementing every aspect of DSGVO, including Art.35 - „creation of a DSFA (Assessment Of Consequences of Data Privacy Measures)“ more than 100 pages thick. Guess what: When I tell customers that we cannot read and really delete their data - they straight up accuse me of lying!

[AtlasBarfed]

Consider these statements:

- state level actors can basically break into any computer system given enough time

- corporate databases have a gigantic amount of information on everyon

- states want all of that data

I hope the conclusion is as straightforward as it seems to me.

OK, not exactly what you are responding about Let's talk about corporate IT systems, let's get into "deleted". Is it:

- deleted from backups? Almost universally this answer will be no.

- deleted from each and every database and system in your presumably huge corporation, which may involve literally thousands of IT systems? I'd guess no.

- is it deleted by moving the data to a separate "deleted data" table or database, thus sequestering the data from the "active data" rather than deleting it, just in case you want to "undo"?

- is it deleted from all system logs?

- is it deleted from all records systems that may have minimum retention periods legally or by policy?

- what about data warehouses or data lakes that repackage/mirror data?

[ashildr]

That’s an interesting point to add to the feature list of a future product: “Proof” of deletion that is plausible to laypeople. Of course one has to delete according to the law, too, but that plausible proof may get rid of a lot of support calls escalating to your level.

[csomar]

> When I tell customers that we cannot read and really delete their data - they straight up accuse me of lying!

I'd accuse you too. If you can't read their data, then the data doesn't exist? Also, if you can't read read their data, how are the customers seeing it on their dashboard?

[st-keller]

I try to explain it shortly: The encrypted data is in a different datacenter than the keys needed to decrypt the data. The services we implemented to bring both together run in an secured environment that has no services implemented to access the servers and where physical access is restricted. Errors and monitoring data gets out, PII does not. Everything is documented and was inspected and certified by a 3rd party. If a customer requests to delete his data we instantly delete the key, a litte later we delete the (already useless) data and all backups will lose this information about a month later too.

And of course we did that not because we are nice people (though we belive we are). We did it, because we had the hypothesis that a reputation to handle the user-data with proofable utmost respect to security and privacy would be more valuable than having access to this data.

People not believing us or accusing us of lying obviously defy that hypothesis.

[cyberpunk]

Row level encryption, yes it’s possible to break the glass but it’s code changes and that sort of thing is noticed by the org and would be reported on.

In the automotive space we are leaning heavily on confidential computing primitives to make it actually impossible, for example keys generated entirely inside enclaves and only attested software can run on those etc etc.

[ivan_gammel]

Client-side encryption?