[uoaei]

> with JWST we see light and need to infer what the underlying properties of the system are

Every theory of dark matter is based exclusively on light-emitting objects. There is no "contrast" between JWST's methods and those of others. Casting aspersions on JWST because it can only see light is like casting aspersions on Galileo because he could only build telescopes. If we could teleport to the things we study and get more information that way, it would be nice, but we live in reality and must bend to its rules.

> highly sensitive to the galaxy formation model that's adopted

I should only need to remind the reader of the classic idiom "cart before the horse" to remind them that this line of reasoning is invalid.

[astroH]

This is a misrepresentation of what I am saying. By no means am I casting an aspersion on JWST. I am casting an aspersion on this particular observation as a test of MOND and LCDM. Also I highly disagree about your comments on my line of reasoning. The fact that you can obtain a huge range of possible galaxy properties in the context of LCDM indicates that in general, tests of LCDM and MOND that rely on galaxy formation model are in usually not strong tests. This is the key issue with using the abundance of high-z galaxies (or even their masses -- despite the fact that these aren't measured) as a test. In the context of LCDM, you need haloes to form galaxies but it has been shown many times that there are enough haloes to solve the problem (see the paper linked) by a huge amount.

[uoaei]

The skepticism you display in this comment is completely absent when you reference lambda-CDM elsewhere. Consistency invites zero criticism :)

[astroH]

And so you have proved my point. The observations presented in this article can be made consistent with both...as such one should think about stronger tests of both LCDM and MOND.

[uoaei]

Your point was orthogonal to the point of epistemology. This isn't Reddit, we respect actual arguments here.

[MattPalmer1086]

You are missing the point. JWST is not being singled out as different here, and no aspersions are being cast.

It is the entirely general point that all we can observe is the light, and we have to infer what that means. Maybe things are bright because there's a lot of stars. Maybe there aren't but there is not much dust. Maybe there aren't so many stars but they are bigger and brighter. There is room to fit many different models on the basis of the light that is observed.

[ab5tract]

I like this point a lot. But then I have to ask... why do I continuously encounter arguments that claim that the fundamental science of these scales is simply settled?

It feels like I read claims that dark matter is both a "given fact" and a "placeholder abstraction" -- from the same person, or at least perspective. They just choose to shift betweeen the two based on what serves their upper hand in a discussion better.

Or reading someone mention that "there is no fundamental difference between mass and energy" while simultaneously defending an entirely gravity-based cosmology that depends on the mass of particles... as if simple energy could not also contribute the same impact of said particles.

I think in general there is a feeling that any theory or speculation which is not dubbed into the dignity of mainstream, accepted dogma needs to be kicked out of the discourse. The fact that we are ultimately inferring in all cases is left out of the discussion and that seems to flatten all "outside" perspectives into a single umbrella of pseudoscience, despite this label accurately fitting -- under the above conditions -- onto heliocentrism, germ theory, chromosonal genetics, plate tectonics, the physical existence of Troy, and just about every paradigm that has resulted in scientific progress in the past.

I'm absolutely not claiming that all things currently labelled psuedoscientific are built the same. I only mean to highlight that science highlights "this is all inference" when it suits it best but otherwise -- in my experience -- discourages such frank reference to its own fallibility when confronted with alternative inferences.

[uoaei]

In my experience this mostly occurs when people don't recognize names like Popper and Feierabend, and consider science and humanities to be mutually exclusive. Likely borne of a neurotic desire for certainty in all things. At least, that's my best guess having been steeped in the cultures of academia and industry for so long.