[LtWorf]

I think the end goal is to only allow github/google whatever accounts to publish code on Pypi, so importing whatever will be USA-sanctions safe.

The burden to ban russians/koreans/iranians will be on those big companies and pypi will be able to claim they respect the rules without having the resources themselves to ban accounts from sanctioned countries.

So in my opinion, in the future tooling will have some option to check if the software was uploaded via microsoft et al and can be considered unsanctioned in USA.

Or they might just say that's how you upload now and that's it.

[doctorpangloss]

> so importing whatever will be USA-sanctions safe...

You are talking about guys who can barely figure out how to structure a Python package repository. They are not doing this kind of 4D chess.

And anyway, none of that makes any sense.

[LtWorf]

The people paying for this, not them.

[woodruffw]

None of this is true. There is no plan to disable API token uploads to PyPI or to mandate Trusted Publishing, much less attestations. It's entirely intended to be a misuse-resistant way to upload to the index in the "happy case" where the package uses a CI/CD workflow that supports OpenID Connect.

(I'm disappointed by the degree to which people seem to gleefully conspiracize about Python packaging, and consequently uncritically accept the worse possible interpretation of anything done to try and improve the ecosystem.)

[zahlman]

>(I'm disappointed by the degree to which people seem to gleefully conspiracize about Python packaging, and consequently uncritically accept the worse possible interpretation of anything done to try and improve the ecosystem.)

I sympathize, but there are obvious reasons for this: low trust in the Python packaging system generally (both because of recent PSF activity and because of the history of complications and long-standing problems), and the fact that many similar things have been seen in the Linux and open-source worlds lately (for one example, Linux Mint's new stance on Flatpak and how they present Flatpak options in the Software Manager). (Edit: it also kinda rhymes with the whole "Secure Boot" thing and how much trouble it causes for Linux installation.)

[woodruffw]

I personally expect people to have better compartmentalization skills than this. It's both unreasonable and inappropriate to have a general chip on your shoulder, and consequently assume a negative interpretation of an unrelated security effort.

[LtWorf]

It happens that people don't trust you if you are being obviously dishonest.

I still have to understand how the github credentials stored on my computer are harder to steal than the pypi credentials stored on the very same computer.

If you can explain this convincingly, maybe I'll start to believe some of the things you claim.

[woodruffw]

> I still have to understand how the github credentials stored on my computer are harder to steal than the pypi credentials stored on the very same computer.

This is not, and has never been, the argument for Trusted Publishing. The argument is that temporary, automatically scoped credentials are less dangerous than permanent, user scoped credentials, and that an attacker who does steal them will struggle to maintain persistence or pivot to other scoped projects.

The documentation is explicit[1] about needing to secure your CI workflows, and treating them as equivalent to long-lived API tokens in terms of security practices. Using a Trusted Publisher does not absolve you of your security obligations; it only reduces the scope of failures within those obligations.

[1]: https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/security-model/

[LtWorf]

> The argument is that temporary, automatically scoped credentials are less dangerous than permanent, user scoped credentials

Nobody forced you to implement never expiring global tokens in pypi…

[justincormack]

My github credentials are all stored in hardware devices.

[LtWorf]

Yes a computer is a hardware device.

[LtWorf]

I don't think you can predict the future any more than me.

[woodruffw]

I don't baselessly speculate about it. But yes, I do think I can predict with some confidence that PyPI is not going to remove API token access.

[doctorpangloss]

I understand the desire to raise awareness about your fringe concern. But it makes no sense.