[saithound]

> Stenography is just security by more obscurity

Security-by-obscurity is when security hinges on keeping your algorithm itself (as opposed to some key) hidden from the adversary.

I don't see how it has any connnection with what you're alluding to here.

[Jerrrrrrry]

the point here is to dissipate it across enough mediums as to be indiscernible from noisy background fluctuations regardless of existence, giving general-deniability to all mediums eventually, thru signal to noise ratio.

all security is just obscurity, eventually, where you are obscuring your private key's semi-prime's factors.

[kortilla]

> all security is just obscurity, eventually, where you are obscuring your private key's semi-prime's factors.

This is a lazy take that obscures the definition to uselessness. It’s perpetuated by people who make insecure systems that break when the algorithm is known.

There is a vast gulf between:

- security depends on secret algorithm

- security depends on keeping a personal asymmetric key secret

The latter is trivial to change, it doesn’t compromise the security of others using the scheme, and if it has perfect forward secrecy it doesn’t even compromise past messages.

Please don’t repeat that mantra. You’re doing a disservice to anyone who reads it and ultimately yourself.

[vasco]

All security is obscurity. I think it's laughable that you believe you know what someone does just because they say this. Consider there's many levels of knowledge about a topic and sometimes when you get to a deeper level your conclusion or the labels you use for stuff "flip".

Understanding the differences that you outlined is so basic that a good commenter wouldn't assume they don't know the difference, they are making a deeper point.

[kortilla]

No, anyone who knows more than a surface level understands the difference between these and doesn’t muddle them.

What you’re doing is the equivalent of saying there is no difference between a parachute and an airplane.

[vasco]

You should deepen your reading comprehension.

[saithound]

When a commenter doesn't know how to even spell the word "steganography", it's quite safe to assume that they don't possess deeper level knowledge and are not making any deeper point about it.

[panarky]

I assumed the numerous too-obvious errors were some form of code for information hiding.

[Jerrrrrrry]

et tú, too?

[Jerrrrrrry]

trivial grammar/spelling mistakes are worse than running analogies into the ground without hitting the "context" button, or even the reductio ad absurdium train HN has been on lately.

yes my latin half-Freudian trans-alliterations can be tempting to pick out, i had another tab with stylometry obfuscation described, incident, and mitigated.

also giigles spellcheck sucks ass, and im tired of being gaslit of my word choice/spelling by giigles, who should know every word by now, in all languages

  >don't possess deeper level knowledge

umm besides error-correcting codes reducing the bitrate, compression, and random byte padding to fend off correlation/timing attacks, there is no where to hide data, outside of the shannon limit for information thru a medium.

but its easy to hide data you cannot perceive; and everyone being conscious of this feat/fingerprinting, even if barely, does more towards efficacy to deter leaking via second-order "chilling effect" than the aftermath; I.P theft is hard to un-approximate

also stenography, ironically still being the only "real" signature, is still security thru obscurity with more steps; your literal stenographic signature is unique, but not preventable from duplicity, so it is un-obscurable.

also i know rsa != ECC plz dont

[47282847]

A person that experiences correction and criticism as gaslighting has serious mental health issues. Talk to a therapist. Get help.

[a2800276]

But you do have to admit that they know very many big important sounding words, go off on extremely dope tangents ("second order chilling effects!" Fuck yeah!) AND say "giigle" instead of Google, which is a.) super cool (obviously) but I suspect there's b.) a darker reason: they are probably a rouge cryptoanarchist being hunted down by The Algorithm and are only able to survive on the streets because of there every-day-carry RF blocking wallet and screwdriver combo and their ability to outsmart Google, because it hasn't learned all the words yet.

Good luck bro, continuing to obscure the entropic state of the x-M medium and remain plausibly deniable. Shannon in the (his?) house, mothafucka! Stenography FTW!

[Jerrrrrrry]

  >second order chilling effects

in the context of preventing leaks: if/when this nears ubiquity, the first ID'ing of leaks will obviously lead to the second effect of deterring further leaks.

  >their ability to outsmart Google

it knows all the words: that is why i should not had had to had reminded it incessantly.

  >continuing to obscure the entropic state of the x-M medium and remain plausibly deniable

lemme draw this out cuz you seem intimidated with simple abstractions.

imagine a three page power-point composed of Header, Text, companyLogo, no other data, aside from inclination from the plane.

under the plausibility presumption the header and text and company logo cannot be within ~15 interval degrees from the plane, you only have a state-space of so many combinations, which puts a hard limit (Shannon's) on the medium's maximum signal/noise ratio.

assuming people cannot collude to delineate between copies, they arent going to be able to perceive subtle shifts in the inclination/position/font/inclusion/exclusion of elements.

however more generally, this key-space needed for the LEAKER_ID wont be much larger (in magnitude) than the user pool of potential leakers, with a simple CRC for resiliency.