| Arguably the problem is that Boeing absolutely and utterly failed to do what they set out to do. After all, if the MCAS failures would present like the usual 737 runaway stabilizer, then the certified pilots would have been able to handle it as such. Since the "runaway MCAS" was a completely new phenomenon (one factor being the absolutely idiotic "on for a few seconds and then off for some" cycle). And as we know the FAA also was clueless, as they approved Boeing's "safety analysis". >>> Extensive interviews with people involved with the program, and a review of proprietary documents, show how Boeing originally designed MCAS as a simple solution with a narrow scope, then altered it late in the plane’s development to expand its power and purpose. Still, a safety-analysis led by Boeing concluded there would be little risk in the event of an MCAS failure — in part because of an FAA-approved assumption that pilots would respond to an unexpected activation in a mere three seconds. And, just to drive whatever point home, on top of all this the FAA completely dropped the ball, because it did not notice that they allowed Boeing to break their own base conditions which in effect invalidated the safety analysis. >>> As Boeing and the FAA advanced the 737 MAX toward production, they limited the scrutiny and testing of the MCAS design. Then they agreed not to inform pilots about MCAS in manuals, even though Boeing’s safety analysis expected pilots to be the primary backstop in the event the system went haywire. It's understandable that Boeing wanted to avoid simulator training, but apparently this regulatory discontinuity (ie. either same or different, no in-between, as far as I understand) forced them to concentrate so much on avoiding the need for new type certification that they ended up completely believing their own crazy tale about the two models' sameness, which led to hiding information from pilots. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the... |
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S10575...