| > Are they? After Chinese private tech companies got too big, they reigned them in and made them closer to the state than ever. I'd love to see actual proof that China is really lessening it's involvement in companies, because I haven't seen such a trend in a significant manner I'm only talking about the semiconductor industry, and yes, the China at trying to develop a private sector in the entire Semiconductor supply chain via the Big Fund [0]. While the capital provided is coming from SOEs, the actual ownership and entities are privately owned. I recommend reading "State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism Is Transforming the World" by Joshua Kurlantzick if you want to dig deeper into this - https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/State%20Capitalism%2... > None of the conglomerate subsidiaries have a monopoly in any sector or country like, for example, Google does in ads and search, or Intel did in CPUs for a decade or so, with >80% market shares Again, I am specifically talking about the Semiconductor industry. For processor fabrication, Samsung is the primary (like Intel in the US) For memory fabrication, SK Hynix is the primary (like Micron in the US) For packaging/OSAT, Hana Micron is the primary (like Micron in the US). All these entities have historically gotten land and government loans at very marginal prices [1], and are parts of historically prominent chaebols (eg. Samsung Group, SK Group) and continue to gain subsidizes to this day [2]. The key linchpin for financing in the semiconductor space in South Korea is the Korea Development Bank, who is providing 0.8%-1% loans to "established businesses" in the semiconductor industry. This is similar to the CHIPS Act, yet last I checked, Samsung Group and SK Group remain private sector conglomerates. > They're run very independently. Yet the bulk of financing in the semiconductor industry always came from state-owned KDB Bank and lent to basically 2 conglomerates and their vendors, and land acquisition was simplified by providing access to land and financing at marginal rates in clusters like Gumi and Yongin. You cannot deny that the bulk of these funds do simply go to a handful of "too big to fail" conglomerates. This is the exact same model Taiwan and Japan followed, and what China and India are starting to do, and imo, this is the same model we need to follow in the US as well for our semiconductor industry. [0] - https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-sets-up-475-bln-sta... [1] - https://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/bitstream/11125/29891/1/The... [2] - https://www.wsj.com/tech/south-korea-unveils-19-billion-pack... |
> I'm only talking about the semiconductor industry, and yes, the China at trying to develop a private sector in the entire Semiconductor supply chain via the Big Fund [0].
Interesting! Even then, I can see that only lasting until they get semi-succesful, just like Tencent et. al.
Your main point seems to boil down to "subsidizing semiconductors makes sense", and I think you're absolutely right there! But I don't see many here argue against that. It doesn't contradict the message of the first comment you replied to: "We should let failing businesses fail. Everyone would have learned their lessons a long time ago and we would have less corporate greed/corpo-political corruption". Both can be true at the same time.
One note though, borrowing from your other reply:
> This "capitalist doctrine" of shareholder return is alive and well in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Take a look at KOPSI or Nikkei sometime.
The KOSPI is generally seen both by domestic as well as international investors as a complete joke, and a big reason behind it is in fact the main argument the parent comment was arguing for; unlike the US, shareholder returns are not put above all else by the conglomerate subsidiaries. Investors don't like this, and so see the market as completely unreliable.