[causi]

I don't understand why authorities even respond to bomb threats at all. If your security procedures are sufficient to keep people from bombing planes, bomb threats are irrelevant. If someone intends to bomb a plane, they don't announce it, making bomb threats doubly irrelevant. An institution getting a bomb threat is about as consequential as someone threatening to kill you in a Youtube comment.

[michaelt]

> If someone intends to bomb a plane, they don't announce it

In the heyday of IRA terrorism, they would regularly phone in threats shortly before a bomb went off.

It's much easier to claim responsibility for a bombing if one does so before the bomb goes off. And when one's aim is political pressure, one might prefer to target military/ police/ infrastructure/ politicians/ whatever with fewer civilian casualties.

Of course there were also plenty of bombings without phone threats, so make of that what you will. And in one of the most deadly bombings - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omagh_bombing - the warning didn't specify the location of the bomb, and people 'evacuated' towards the bomb.

[scotty79]

It's an opportunity to flex. Public wants it, public loves it.

[burnished]

Citations needed, specifically the claim that bombers act exclusively or primarily in silence.

[causi]

I couldn't find any examples of airline bombings that were preceded by threats.

[dredmorbius]

Famously:

D. B. Cooper, also known as Dan Cooper, was an unidentified man who hijacked Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 305, a Boeing 727 aircraft, in United States airspace on November 24, 1971. During the flight from Portland, Oregon, to Seattle, Washington, Cooper told a flight attendant he had a bomb, demanded $200,000 in ransom (equivalent to approximately $1,500,000 in 2024) and four parachutes upon landing in Seattle.

Cooper showed a device which by all appearances may have been a bomb, though its ultimate capabilities were never conclusively determined:

[Cooper] opened his briefcase, and she saw two rows of four red cylinders, which she assumed were dynamite. Attached to the cylinders were a wire and a large, cylindrical battery, which resembled a bomb.

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D._B._Cooper>

Regardless, there was an actual terrorist threat and hijacking, so the threat itself wasn't merely "phoned in".

The incident inspired numerous copycats:

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D._B._Cooper_copycat_hijacking...>

There's a longer list of aircraft-involved terrorism incidents which might yield other forewarning instances:

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aviation_incidents_inv...>

[causi]

Those are not airline bombings so I don't know why you think they're relevant. People do not call airlines, say they're going to blow up a plane, and then blow up a plane. Ever.

[dredmorbius]

The Cooper and copycat actions involved in some cases actual or plausible explosives, and at least the threat to blow up a plane.

The longer list of airline-terrorism incidents may (I haven't combed through it thoroughly), and I'd posted that for you or another reader to dig through should there be an interest.

I do acknowledge your general observation that most cases of phoned-in airline bomb threats don't appear to involve actual (or even dummy) explosives, the threat itself is sufficiently disruptive. And that for those intent on actually blowing up an aircraft, it's the act and not the mere threat which is sufficient. That said, I'm not convinced that that's always the case, and at the very least the Cooper and related instances seem to offer reasonably near-instance exceptions.

My aim really isn't nit-picking, pedantry, or belligerence, but an aim for accuracy. And again, your larger point certainly seems to cover most instances. If we can shake out some exceptions that would be interesting.

Thanks for your information and observations, BTW.

[causi]

the threat itself is sufficiently disruptive

Exactly. My point is that it shouldn't be, because there's about as much actual danger as a twelve year old cursing at you on Xbox Live.

[blibble]

> If your security procedures are sufficient

that's the problem isn't it?

airport security is pretty much the definition of "security theater"

and deep down the authorities (hopefully) realise this