[cosignal]

Just to be clear, "the information-processing dynamics of ‘simpler’ forms of life" being "part of a continuum with human cognition" does not strictly imply "Cognition as a property of all matter". Also, I fail to see how the latter is the "simplest premise for any materialist theory of the mind". How is it simpler to say that "all matter has cognition as a basic property" than to assume "certain arranges of matter exhibit cognition"?

[Lerc]

"certain arranges of matter exhibit cognition"

This is the threshold I talk about in my sibling comment. It is very difficult to come up with a materialist argument for what about that 'certain arrangement' makes cognition. I am unsure if it is possible to prove that there is no such argument, but I don't think we have made any progress in finding one either.

[Ukv]

> It is very difficult to come up with a materialist argument for what about that 'certain arrangement' makes cognition

I'd claim it's not necessarily harder than it is to argue certain arrangements make a computer. Which is to say, there's grey area but it's ultimately just a label we give to certain patterns/behavior, not some special line where the universe starts doing something different, so it's fine to be somewhat vague/arbitrary (when do sand grains become a heap?).

I think "Cognition as a property of all matter" is leaning too much towards panpsychism. There's a spectrum of chairs from thrones to stumps, but I wouldn't say "Chairness is a property of all matter".

[brudgers]

“Exhibit cognition” is weak sauce anyway.

Do we doubt people we know think when they are absent? Is our phone exhibiting cognition when we have telephone conversations?

[tshaddox]

Isn’t that just the sorites paradox?

[Lerc]

I don't think so. The distinction is about whether or not there is a point of transition. The sorites paradox is more about identifying where the transition is. You can apply sorites paradox to a colour gradient going from red to , green arguing you can't pinpoint the threshold but you wouldn't deny that the transition point is somewhere within the range.

I never found the sorites paradox to be a terribly challenging argument in itself. Formal proofs rely on the assumption that a tiny change to a state is the same is no change and thus an an accumulation of tiny changes is also no change. I just don't accept the base premise. The common sense arguments with grains of sand in a pile, trees in a forest etc. just seem to rely on the vagueness of definition allowing individual judgement to place the threshold at different places.

[brudgers]

The sorites paradox depends on a slight of hand -- applying the pedantry of logic to ordinary language. Or to put it another way, like a pun or double entendre it is naught but clever word play. The language game falls apart in technical contexts, for example there's no sorites paradox for heaps in computer science.

[brudgers]

I did not say the statement implied my comment.

My comment was on the philosophical shortcomings of the statement in particular and the philosophical shortcomings of socially acceptable expressions of materialism in general.

“Particular arranges” is mind-body dualism with lipstick.