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by Workaccount2
631 days ago
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>but also still arrive at those results via completely different means. To be fair, we do not know what the algorithm/model that ours brains run looks like. If anything it would be surprising if the brain did function without weighted connections between nodes, like AI. |
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For example, I continue to question two propositions that many others seem to take for granted when they try to predict what LLMs can and cannot do well:
Over the past couple years I've grown to be much more sympathetic to Searle's Chinese Room argument. LLMs are incredibly good at mimicking human behavior and performing tasks that were previously impossible for machines. But as you examine what they're doing more closely you start to see them failing in all sorts of interesting ways that remind you that they're still very much in an uncanny valley of sorts.Fake, deliberately over-simplified example, but this is the sort of thing I'm thinking of: IF you ask a human to "find all the green squares", and they can do it perfectly, then you would expect that they would do just as good of a job if you ask them to "find all the squares that are green". That sort of expectation does not work with GPT-4. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't, and the pattern of when it does and doesn't is fascinating.
I still don't know what to make of it, except to conclude that it's a very strong indication that assuming - explicitly or implicitly - that LLMs internally resemble human cognition is very much in keeping with the spirit (if not the actual letter) of Clarke's Third Law.