[Stem0037]

I'm skeptical of some of the claims about technological innovation being higher during periods of fragmentation. Correlation doesn't equal causation - there could be other factors at play. Still, an intriguing hypothesis worth exploring further.

[lumost]

I suspect that the motivating factor is lack of deployable human capital. In a large centralized society, there may always people to deploy at the problem. The more people you deploy at the problem, the more time the people at the top spend thinking about people issues and the bureaucracy that comes with that. The bottleneck usually happens when the people at the top become so focused on bureaucracy/politics/corruption that nothing really gets done.

Fragmented societies are less prone to bureaucracy, and more prone to not having enough people available to solve a problem. These factors absolutely help innovation.

[qwytw]

> Fragmented societies are less prone to bureaucracy, and more prone to not having enough people available to solve a problem.

Competition probably also played a part. If the emperor in China or Ancient Rome decided to ban or restrict certain fields/groups/ideas you were pretty screwed, innovation likely stopped, most progress was lost and the next generations had to start from scratch. In Europe you could just move to the next state or city. Same applies to major invasions and societal collapses, e.g. the Byzantine scholars fleeing to Italy during/after the Turkish invasions.

[Nasrudith]

War is a well known factor for innovation, and it tends to go together with periods of fragmentation. Probably less innovation than a war against a rival external power.

[lupusreal]

It could easily be the other way around; new technology leading to new wars as nations feel empowered by their new toys to act on their ambitions. The first world war occurred shortly after the introduction of smokeless powder and machine guns. These inventions were certainly funded by some military spending and perhaps even prompted by earlier wars, but in large part they were technologies who's time had come; precision manufacturing and chemical technology had only made these things possible shortly before they were invented.

The development of "smart bombs" like the Walleye television bomb happened about as soon as they were technologically feasible; the idea for a fire-and-forget television bomb came from an engineer who was playing around with a new model of commercial TV camera. Emboldened by these new weapons, American politicians started wars which previously they might have considered too politically costly if they had to be fought using older methods. Desert Storm particularly.

[inglor_cz]

The Russo-Ukrainian war saw a huge explosion of drone warfare, but I am mostly certain that it didn't happen due to military drones coming of age.

[lupusreal]

Those drones weren't developed because of the war. But the existence of those drones (among other newish technologies) might plausibly have something to do with Ukraine believing they can successfully resist.

[inglor_cz]

If you follow the war closely, the development of the drones during the war is absolutely breathtaking.

Originally, Ukraine had a few Bayraktars (nowadays hopelessly obsolete) and some observation drones. They couldn't even use drones against armor. The original losses of Russian armor in 2022 were mostly due to Javelins, NLAWs and similar specialized weapons.

Nowadays, the Ukrainians deploy jet-powered Palyanitsya drones to the deep rear of the enemy and regularly destroy heavy equipment with explosive drones.

[qwytw]

> factor for innovation

That's not so obvious, at least in fields not directly related to warfarce e.g. Byzantine Empire was probably the most innovative, progressive and developed state in Europe (if not the world by ~1000 AD) constant endless warfare turned it into an empty shells by the 1400s.

Extreme instability, violence etc. rarely has a positive effect. Relatively peaceful primary economic competition (perhaps with some limited warfare) between multiple states might lead to very positive outcomes, though.

[lordnacho]

This is one of those claims that people tend to repeat without giving any evidence. Seems like there's some sort of attempt using Needham's data.

[logicchains]

There was a lot more innovation in Europe, particularly in military technology, in the 17th-19th centuries, due to many smaller states competing against each-other, compared to the Ottoman Empire and China. That's why Europe was able to so easily subjugate China.

[qwytw]

> to many smaller states competing against each-other, compared to the Ottoman Empire and China

Did wars really have a positive impact on that though? I don't think the 30 years war etc. had such a positive impact, rather it probably slowed down progress by quite a bit.

[maxglute]

Maybe too much of meta tangent: mccarthyism 2.0 = take scholarship from Chinese Americans with grain of salt. Or at least be aware of motivations. Yasheng Huang slowly transiting to "house chink" - suspect Huang's trying to avoid becoming a Gang Chen in the next wave of China Initiative purges, so not surprising some of his analysis has gotten more "motivated" over the years. The one's who don't play the game, i.e. Cheng Li from Brookings, don't get the podium anymore. There's still "libtard" audiences in PRC who eats Huang's work up, the main propaganda pitch of this book is:

> I really want to push back against this view that automatically you have a Western ideological view because you emphasize diversity, freedom, and competition, and that somehow is ideology rather than fact. I’m telling that story from China’s own history. I do hope that I win some hearts from people who have an automatic immunity to Western ideas.

...

> I aim to convey this message through Chinese history, hoping to persuade people to reconsider their aversion to diversity and competition.

...

>"Too much autocratic stability is detrimental"

Gets challenged on Song innovation. No, no, I've rescaled importance of inventions, downplaying "four great inventions" that Chinese find significant, which conveniently illustrates Song is less innovative than Han-Sui interregnum, I hope the take away for PRC is that Chinese innovation the strongest when China most fragmented and mired in chaos. Get's challenged on commerce. No, no, historic/current Chinese commerce too restricted to launch industrial revolutions, see Jack Ma. NVM PRC explicitly did not want industrial revolution in unchecked financialization. Or PRC biasing scale in lieu of scope is pushing involution tier industrial revolution in many strategic sectors, i.e. PRC in a place to pick what revolution to scale. "In contrast, Western countries resolved this tension by embracing scope", except this came at the expense of scale, and one of PRC's biggest advantage is acknolwedging and pursuing quantity having quality of it's own. Funny how blob incentives map to imperial bureaucracy, think tanks another incarnation of posturing eunuchs vying for position (or not losing it) at the end of the day.