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It is not really just about Trump. It is quite obvious at least since Obama that US strategic interests are reorienting towards Southeast Asia, which is understandable as half of humanity lives there. And even with a friendly administration, it can feasibly happen that there will be more crises unfolding at the same time than the US is capable of efficiently addressing. (Say, Ukraine and Israel and Taiwan.) I wonder how much of a choice the other countries have. Being a European and observing European political patterns, I am very sure that Finland, Sweden, Denmark and most of the former Soviet satellites will continue to support Ukraine because they know what is at stake for them. The UK may as well, given that the dislike between England and Russia goes a long way back. But there are influential people in Germany (and I am not talking about the AfD here, but about the industrial lobby) constantly pushing in the back rooms for reconciliation with Russia at any cost, because high energy costs have made a mess of the German economy, and I can see something like a repeat of the Munich betrayal of 1938 in the future. At this phase of the war, Putin would be open to such an agreement with Germany. Not even his wildest plans foresee a re-subjugation of the former GDR, so Germany risks "nothing" (well, a lot of goodwill east of the Oder, but that may be an acceptable tradeoff for the businesspeople). And the more distant countries such as Spain or the Netherlands or Belgium aren't really that much interested in Eastern European affairs, all the verbal proclamations notwithstanding. Although NL has some unsettled business against Russia with regards to that shot down airliner. |