[akira2501]

Other than bad press there's no immediate incentive for the company to avoid stiffing researchers. Bug bounty programs work if the company is vulnerable to bad press and it would actually impact their bottom line.

This is not from an examination of when bug programs work but when they have very demonstrably not worked in the past.

[tptacek]

Press is a perfect example of incentive alignment in these programs, since not paying a bounty a researcher believes is deserved is practically a guarantee of an uncharitable blog post.

[LegionMammal978]

Which process ensures that the company should actually care in the slightest about an uncharitable blog post or two, especially when its motivations are opaque enough that the lack of payment might be chalked up to "there's a good reason for that"?

If the cost of an uncharitable blog post is less than the cost of paying out the bounty, then a company would still be incentivized to find as many reasons to reject a payout as possible, as long as future reporters still believe they have a good chance of receiving a payout (e.g., if they believe they can sideskirt any rejection reasons).

[tptacek]

The cost of an uncharitable blog post is massively more than the price of a bounty, like, it's not even close. The cost of an uncharitable blog post is potentially unbounded (as in: not many people in a large tech company would know how to put a ceiling on the cost), and the cost of a bounty, even a high one, is more or less chump change.

Another in my long-running dramatic series "businesses pay spectacularly more for determinism and predictability than nerds like us account for".

[LegionMammal978]

> The cost of an uncharitable blog post is potentially unbounded (as in: not many people in a large tech company would know how to put a ceiling on the cost), and the cost of a bounty, even a high one, is more or less chump change.

Look up "apple bug bounty" on Google, or any other search engine of your choice, and you'll find absolutely no shortage of people complaining of issues with the program. If these complaints each cost Apple a bajillion dollars, then why haven't they shut down their program already?

Or, if almost all of those complaints are just from the reporter being dumb, then how are potential future reporters (who would care about the company's prospenity to pay) supposed to find actual meaningful complaints among the noise?

I don't think that sporadic blog posts are nearly as powerful as you're making them out to me: my intuition tells me that the company can usually ignore them safely, short of them making front-page news.

[tptacek]

Look, I believe you, but people complain about all these bounty programs, some of which I know to have been extraordinarily well managed, and usually when you get to the bottom of those complaints it comes down to a misapprehension the researchers have about what the bounty program is doing and what its internal constraints are. I acknowledge that another possibility is that the bounty program itself isn't performing well; that is a possibility (I have no actual knowledge about this particular case!)

The only thing here I'm going to push back on, and forcefully, is the idea that bounty programs have an incentive to stiff researchers. They do not. I cannot emphasize enough how "not real money" these sums are. Bounty program operators, the people staffing these programs, don't get measured on how few bounties they pay out.

[LegionMammal978]

My point is that while the sums might be "not real money", the costs of stiffing researchers is even moreso "not real money", so that it makes sense on the margin to do it, whenever the situation isn't incredibly clear-cut.

After all, it's not like Apple goes around handing out free iPhones on the street, even though a few thousand units are similarly "not real money". Businesses care about small effects on the margin.

[sho]

> I'm going to push back on, and forcefully, is the idea that bounty programs have an incentive to stiff researchers. They do not

I replied upstream as well, but let me push back here as well. They can actually, if the bounty program is being run for the wrong reasons, which can happen - I know anecdotes aren't data, but I've seen one case first-hand.

If a bounty program is treated as a marketing project and/or an "executive value" project then they can and will be managed as a cost center and those costs will be deliberately minimized. Bang for buck. Now obviously this is perverse but if making your manager happy isn't an incentive then I don't know what to tell you.

[saagarjha]

Companies are not set up to accurately and effectively gauge the impact of intangible costs to themselves.

[tptacek]

Exactly, which is why intangible costs will tend to be overpriced compared to risks with low cost ceilings, like "paying out an extra bounty".

[dullcrisp]

I think both the point you’re making and the idea you’re arguing against ascribe a level of agency and rationality to large organizations that doesn’t reflect their reality. In that way they’re both “not even wrong.”

But then I can see your point to a degree at least.

[saagarjha]

The cost here is Apple changing their processes which is exceptionally painful for them

[planetpluta]

Maybe not “immediate” but withholding rewards results in fewer researchers participating in bounty programs which defeats the purpose.

[jtbayly]

Not if the (true) purpose of having the bounty program is simply PR, rather than an honest desire to find and fix bugs.

[tptacek]

The true purpose of these programs is to direct research to specific threats and engineering areas.