[dragonwriter]

> In the thought experiment, when Mary sees red for the first time, it seems that she gains new knowledge that she did not have before even though she knew everything there is to know about the properties of matter involved. You have to either accept that she learned something nonphysical, or deny that she learned anything.

No, you don't. You just have to accept that the facts about physical phenomenon that can be learned through language are different than the physical experience of physical phenomena themselves, and that learning the latter is distinct from learning the former. The latter, however, is obviously physical.

And, even if it wasn't wrong in that way, that would be an argument for the nonphysicality of some subset of the subjects of knowledge, not an argument for the nonphysicality of consciousness.

[canjobear]

> the facts about physical phenomenon that can be learned through language are different than the physical experience of physical phenomena themselves

Whether she learned through language is irrelevant. Before seeing red, she might have learned about it by consulting extensive charts of the brain, or (black-and-white) videos of timecourses of brain activation. Maybe she even got to run computer simulations of her own brain response.

By construction Mary already knew everything physical about the color red, so the new knowledge she gained through consciously experiencing it is not knowledge about anything physical.

[j_bum]

Indeed, I think the parent comment presents a false dichotomy fallacy. Thanks for catching it