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by bambax 658 days ago
> Expected value is absolutely not a good way to make bets if you value survival

Yes! The St. Petersburg "Paradox" shows that we intuitively know that. I put "paradox" in quotes because I don't think it's a paradox, it's just a sane reaction.

(Sam Bankman-Fried was a big fan of EV and famously declared that he would toss a coin where heads would double the "value" (?) of the world but tails would destroy it.)

In short, the St. Petersburg paradox goes as follows: a fair coin is tossed until heads come up, and the player wins $2^n, where n is the number of times the coin was flipped. So for example if heads come up on the first flip the player gets $2, if it comes up on the second they get $4, on the third, $8, on the tenth $1024 (2^10), etc. It's easy to show that the expected value of the game is infinite (approaches infinity).

Therefore, someone perfectly rational (?) should be willing to pay virtually any amount of money to play the game, because any finite amount of money is less than an infinite amount of money, and therefore the expected gain is always positive.

Yet you will probably not find many people (except SBF?) willing to pay millions of dollars to play that game.

It's only a paradox if we think it shows that people are not "rational". But I think it simply shows EV is not a good measure of risk, and everyone knows it.

Very complete and fascinating article about the St. Petersburg Paradox here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-stpetersburg/

5 comments

What idiot wouldn't put destruction of the world as '-infinity' of value?

Equating money with value is a simple trap as well. Who cares if you can win millions when a single loss wipes out all your savings? Since anything below a certain level of money leaves you trapped with no way out it could be argued that the value of being destitute is not 0 but -infinity which makes any risk of losing all money unacceptable. This is especially true in a world where people are willing to offer strange bets with arbitrarily high expected value as long as you have some money.

> What idiot wouldn't put destruction of the world as '-infinity' of value?

Literally anyone, you included. Every day, there is a chance that the roof collapse on you while you're sleeping; that's -Inf of value! Yet you don't put infinity resources into preventing that since you consider the probability low enough to not obsess over it.

No, I don't put infinity resources into it because that would make me die even earlier due to not having money or time to do what is necessary to stay alive.
> value of being destitute is not 0 but -infinity which makes any risk of losing all money unacceptable.

that's just loss aversion codified.

The context can also be very important. For instance: In case A, you have $50, and are offered to bet them against a fair coin flip, if you guess right you win another $50, if you guess wrong you lose your $50; in this case the most rational choice would be to refuse to play the game. In case B, you have $50, and are offered to bet them against a fair coin flip, if you guess right you win another $50, if you guess wrong you lose your $50; in this case the most rational choice would be to agree to play this game.

The missing context is that in case A, you need in 10 minutes to repay $50 debt to the Sicilian mafia, or else they'll kill you to make an example for others, and you have no other assets or other ways to make money in this short time. In case B, the situation is the same, but you owe $100 instead of $50.

The St. Petersburg "paradox" is not a paradox if we consider any real-world implementation of it. The EV accumulates at the rate of $1 per flip. So, if we want to make the EV at least $1,000,000, we must find a counterparty that is willing to pay at least $2^1000000 (or at least 2^1000000 units of "utility" if we're trying to avoid the depreciating utility effect). That's plainly unrealistic. As soon as the counterparty has any fixed upper limit to its ability to pay (or provide utility), the EV becomes finite.
It's interesting that in this context the assumption of infinite growth is obviously unrealistic - but in the context of trad econ, infinite growth is considered a bedrock assumption.

Putting them together suggests it's flagrantly irrational to apply naive toy models to the real world. Even if they do have a nice mathy sheen.

Engineers (mostly) know this, but for some reason gamblers and economists (mostly) act as if they don't.

When you're this far away from saturation, infinite growth is a good approximation.
I don't mean specifically the St. Petersburg paradox but in the context of most things that economists analyze that have an infinite growth assumption.
> It's only a paradox if we think it shows that people are not "rational". But I think it simply shows EV is not a good measure of risk, and everyone knows it.

There are standard arguments (e.g. the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem) that an agent with rational preferences, with remarkably weak definitions of the word “rational”, must have an utility function and a subjective probability function such that their behaviour is always governed by the EV of that utility with respect to that probability.

Yeah but that utility function will not be a linear function of money so you can't say EV(u($$)) == u(EV($$)). This is the mathematical formulation that tells you that it is irrational to risk all your money to make an extra dollar even if u(EV($$)) is positive EV(u($$)) can be negative.
This is interesting to me in the context of a post[1] yesterday about teaching logical thinking to children. One of the top comments was about how, yes, teach logical thinking but also teach other types too. SBF and those who think with a heavy bias towards EV show an extreme weakness towards reality. Of course SBF himself is a perfect example of this. I won’t pretend to know if his math was always right but one of his defenses on trial was essentially “just run the simulations a few more times and we’ll get all the money back” which clearly shows a lack of understanding of reality.

I’m glad to now know there’s a common example of that weakness.

[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41456472

Does he actually calculate expected values or does he just have a sort of winding way of justifying his gut takes?