[ruthmarx]

> The link rules can get pretty granular and seem explicitly designed to prevent that scenario.

It's still an inherent weakness. No getting around that really.

> Assuming the AppArmor profile allows writing to and executing the same files. Which isn't particularly common.

I don't really want to try and come up with examples just so you can show there might be some hacky way of accomplishing something similar to what SELinux can offer - it would be missing my point.

Point is there's a lot more you can do under AppArmor than SELinux. AppArmor isn't as granular and you can't lock down a system to the same extent, period. Is it good enough, sure. Is it better than nothing? Absolutely. Is it comparable to an optimized SELinux config? Not remotely.

> This is possible with AppArmor.

See above.

[NewJazz]

Hacky way to accomplish something? Literally every example you gave of AA not being "granular" enough was flat misinformation. There are dedicated rules to prevent writing and executing the same file, prevent using hardlinks to gain privileges, and prevent overwriting a file that should be append only. No hacks here. Just facts.

[ruthmarx]

> Hacky way to accomplish something?

Yes.

> Literally every example you gave of AA not being "granular" enough was flat misinformation.

No, there was no misinformation, and this stance you're committed to defending is one of the most bizarre stances I've ever come across.

There can be no question that SELinux is significantly more granular than AppArmor any more than there is that the earth is not flat. Looking at the introductory documentation for both systems should be more than enough to make that abundantly clear to anyone.

> There are dedicated rules to prevent writing and executing the same file, prevent using hardlinks to gain privileges, and prevent overwriting a file that should be append only. No hacks here. Just facts.

So just before I put more effort into replying to you, I want to be 100% clear on your stance. If I am paraphrasing or misconstruing, please correct.

It seems like you are claiming that AppArmor using hardlinks is not any sort of vulnerability or weakness and cannot be, and has never been bypassed? Is this a fair reading of your position?

[NewJazz]

My position is that you haven't demonstrated a practical example of SELinux being able to constrain a workload that AppArmor doesn't have parity with, i.e. you haven't responded to my initial question:

Can you offer some examples of things you can restrict with SELinux that you wouldn't be able to with AppArmor?

Only valid answer in the thread has been port bindings - AppArmor's network rules don't allow restricting port number, but SELinux can do that.

You tried to claim that SELinux could prevent processes from overwriting files instead of just appending to them while AppArmor could not do the same, but that statement of yours was easily disprovable -- the man page of apparmor.d shows that append-only rules are supported. If you don't want me to call your statement misinformation, then maybe invent another word because that is the only word I have to describe what you said.

[ruthmarx]

> My position is that you haven't demonstrated a practical example of SELinux being able to constrain a workload that AppArmor doesn't have parity with, i.e. you haven't responded to my initial question:

I listed some of the ways AppArmor falls short, which you dismissed.

If I know an object is 3x3x3 feet, and we have a box that is 5x5x5, and another object that is 7x7x7, I don't need to thoroughly test every aspect of these items or even see them to know one of the won't fit in the box.

> Only valid answer in the thread has been port bindings

Not true. AppArmor lacks several of the models SELinux does, and thus, as has been said, is less granular, and thus, and as has also been said, it covers less area than SELinux does. AppArmor doesn't even consider user accounts as far as policy decisions go, and you can't bind policies to user objects. You realize already what a limitation that is, right?

It's sufficient to look at the designs of both systems to see this, see where one falls short, and not need practical examples to understand.

If you want practical, real world examples of SELinux blocking something AppArmor couldn't, as I said to someone else, a comparison of Debian and redHat security advisories should show this, as I would think it is extremely likely that Debian would significantly less often be able to say the issue isn't a threat if AppArmor is enabled vs RHAT saying the same for SELinux.

But, you want a setup. OK. Does AppArmor allow you to basically take root out of the equation entirely, by assigning only the capabilities a user needs to run specific programs (e.g. like binding a port under 1024) to a non root account? Does it then allow severely limiting the root account so it can't really doing anything and 'getting root' is pointless because you can eliminate the entire concept of an all powerful account? No, it doesn't, and there is plenty more it doesn't allow because it's a simpler and more limited system by design.

> You tried to claim that SELinux could prevent processes from overwriting files instead of just appending to them while AppArmor could not do the same, but that statement of yours was easily disprovable

You're right, this was my mistake. AppArmor either didn't have that functionally the last time I really played with it, or I forgot it had it. That's a bad example, sure, but the overall point is still perfectly valid.

> If you don't want me to call your statement misinformation, then maybe invent another word because that is the only word I have to describe what you said.

As far as AppArmor being able to enforce append only functionality, sure. As far as anything else, not so.