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by __loam
645 days ago
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I'll try to argue his point. The idea that Japan would have resisted to the last man and that a massive amphibious invasion would have been required is kind of a myth. The US pacific submarine fleet had sunk the majority of the Japanese merchant marine to the point that Japan was critically low on war materiel and food. The Japanese navy had lost all of its capital ships and there was a critical shortage of personnel like pilots. The Soviets also invaded and overran Manchuria over a span of weeks. The military wing of the Japanese government certainly wanted to continue fighting but the writing was on the wall. The nuclear bombing of Japanese cities certainly pressed the issue but much of the American Military command in the Pacific thought it was unnecessarily brutal, and Japanese cities had already been devastated by a bombing campaign that included firebombing. I'm not sure that completely aligns with my own views but that's basically the argument, and there are compelling points. |
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The big problem that McArthur and others pointed out is that all the Japanese forces on the Asian mainland and left behind in the Island Hopping campaign through the Pacific were unlikely to surrender unless Japan itself was definitively defeated with the central government capitulating and aiding in the demobilization.
From their perspective the options were to either invade Japan and force a capitulation, or go back and keep fighting it out with every island citadel and throughout China, Indochina, Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria.