| It is ultimately judgment calls by human beings that make the determinations. However, I don't see how you can read this opinion and think that the judges are just making their minds up on the spot. Every single decision point in this opinion goes back to prior cases and either explains why they apply or distinguishes this case from them to explain why they don't. - It's not like Campbell/Rose-Acuff (2 Live Crew v Roy Orbison, the "Pretty Woman" case) because IA's ebooks are not parodies of the original works. They _are_ the original works. - It's not like Sony (the Betamax case in which whole-work copying was found fair because it enabled time-shifting), because there's no sufficiently different use that's not supported by the original copy. You read the book, you read the IA scanned copy. Courts have judgment, but within parameters. The Copyright Act itself spells out four factors for evaluating whether a use is fair, and both courts found that it failed on every factor. The judge can't say, "well, but I still believe that the use should be fair anyway"; that would be an instant reversal and remand, with instructions amounting to "follow what the law says, dummy." This was never really a close call based on prior cases. Transformative use has almost never been "exactly the same work used exactly the same way, but digital." Cases that have tried to make that argument have failed again and again. The "our enforcement ensures that only one person is using the copy at a time" has been tried before as well, and has consistently failed. Back in 2020, my heart sank when I saw IA's announcement that they were doing this, because I was certain that they would be sued for it, and that they would lose if they were. I can't stress enough how obvious these rulings have been if you expect the courts to do what they ordinarily do-- find similarly in similar cases. The Supreme Court can discard all that precedent - they've certainly made a habit of that lately - and create new case law, along with an explanation of the way that they evaluate the factors to find that way. They may in fact do so; they've done that a couple of times in recent decades. However, they don't take many cases, and this case is so clearly in line with past cases that it's hard to see why they would take this one. |
How does this same thing not apply to physical libraries then? Even if the scope were limited to books IA itself owns (which they still denied anyways), why should one-to-one digital lending be any different than physical in-person library book lending?