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> We conducted a user study with 30 Web users, recruited over social media, and presented them each with 20 pairs of websites. Website pairs were randomly selected from both the Related Website Sets list (i.e., sites Google designates as “related”, and so warranting reduced privacy protections), and the Tranco list of popular websites. Each user was presented with different pairs of websites, asked to view the sites, and then decide if they thought the two sites were operated by the same organization. This resulted in 430 determinations of whether unique pairs of websites were related. > In our study, the large majority of users (~73%) made at least one incorrect determination of whether two sites were related to each other, and almost half (~42%) of the determinations made during the study (i.e., all determinations from all users) were incorrect. Most concerning, of the cases where both sites were related (according to the RWS feature), users guessed that the sites were unrelated ~37% of the time, meaning that users would have thought Chrome was protecting them when it was not. > ... We conclude from this that the premise underlying RWS is fundamentally incorrect; Web users are (understandably, predictably) not able to accurately determine whether two sites are owned by the same organization. And as a result, RWS is reintroducing exactly the kinds of privacy harms that third-party cookies cause. > Lest anyone judge the study participants for being uninformed, or not taking the study seriously, consider for yourself: which of the following pairs of sites are related? 1. hindustantimes.com and healthshots.com 2. vwo.com and wingify.com 3. economictimes.com and cricbuzz.com 4. indiatoday.in and timesofindia.com > (For the above quiz, if you chose “4”, then, unfortunately that is incorrect. That is in fact the only pair of the four that isn’t considered “related” to each other.) |
Reminds me of the research that shows that 87% of people in the US can be uniquely identified with only three pieces of information: date of birth, gender, and zip code [1].
[1]: https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.p...