[ko27]

It's funny that you mention hubris and yet you fall victim to it by dismissing the measurement problem and Bell's theorem. It's true that our theories are not a perfect description of "true reality", but they do tell you something about what "true reality" must be.

> That Bell’s theorem “proves” something is language applicable to a mathematical structure, not to the physical world itself.

This is simply wrong, Bell's theorem definitely applies to the "physical world". A world that does not violate Bell's inequality would look vastly different to ours.

[lokimedes]

My point is that theorems are provable in a logical sense. How will you prove that the mathematical representation of an empirical measurement of nature is true in the same sense?

Arguably this is down to philosophy of science, and I admit to take to the ideas of Karl Popper on falsification as a criterion for sound physical theories.