[dave78]

At this point, now that the SpaceX alternative has been officially acknowledged, I really don't see how anyone at NASA would be comfortable risking the return on Starliner. If they do and it fails and the astronauts die, everyone will be (rightly) outraged that a viable rescue plan was available and not used. It could become an existential crisis for NASA.

My belief is that the fact that they're publicly "considering" the SpaceX plan means that they've probably already decided to do that and what we're seeing in the media right now is NASA just letting everyone get used to the idea before they formally commit to it.

[nordsieck]

> My belief is that the fact that they're publicly "considering" the SpaceX plan means that they've probably already decided to do that and what we're seeing in the media right now is NASA just letting everyone get used to the idea before they formally commit to it.

The messaging from NASA has slowly shifted from "They're returning on Starliner" to "They're returning on Starliner, and we're considering contingencies" to "We'll make a decision whether they return on Starliner or Crew Dragon".

It does kind of seem like NASA is giving Boeing as much time as they can to try to pull a rabbit out of a hat, with the understanding that if they don't deliver, that the Astronauts are going back on Crew Dragon.

[bunderbunder]

I gather that they're also worried that the Dragon option turns into another can of worms due to a risk that an automated return of the Starliner could result in bricking the ISS's docking port. Something about how they removed the automated docking/undocking software from Starliner for the crewed mission, for reasons I'm guessing I could not begin to fathom.

[dotnet00]

It isn't that they removed autonomous undocking. IIRC autonomous docking/undocking were part of the requirements for the commercial crew program. Starliner even did attempt an autonomous docking to the station.

The issue is that of fault handling. If the software detects a malfunction when a crew is onboard, the best option is to switch to manual control. But if a crew is not onboard, the craft should handle the failure on its own in the safest possible way.

So, what happened is that they loaded in software which expects the crew to be available. Now, obviously with thruster malfunctions already happening, they can't assume that a fault won't be detected after undocking, so they have to switch the software over to the configuration where it can no longer rely on the crew as a fallback.

[pennomi]

Right, but “switch the configuration” isn’t trivial, they’re estimating something like 4+ weeks of work. IIRC it’s essentially equivalent to reflashing the whole thing and revalidating the install was correct.

[dotnet00]

I agree, what I'm trying to emphasize is that the current software is able to undock autonomously, it isn't able to handle failures autonomously. Many people seem to be thinking that Starliner had been capable of autonomous docking/undocking and the functionality had been removed for seemingly no legitimate reason. But, if we understand that autonomous undocking is present, but autonomous error handling is not, the engineering reason becomes obvious, that when you have a crew available, they're the better option for error handling than the software.

I'm not trying to make the excuse that's going around about how they don't need to change the software, just the configuration. It's absurd that they need 4 weeks for this change when switching from manual to automatic fault handling should be a basic safety contingency (it'd be necessary if the crew had become incapacitated for any reason).

[bunderbunder]

I'm still not convinced this is sound engineering? Shipping two different versions of the software, instead of having some sort of switch you can flip, seems sub-optimal precisely because it increases your exposure to risks like this where you're less able to adapt to unforeseen circumstances because as soon as you wander off the happy path you're in completely uncharted waters. This feels more to me like yet another example of Boeing cutting corners without the benefit of a full understanding of the implications of the decision because their left, right, top, bottom, front, back, charm and strange hands all have no idea what the others are doing.

[skissane]

> Shipping two different versions of the software, instead of having some sort of switch you can flip, seems sub-optimal precisely

Someone on X was saying that NASA's definition of "flight software" includes config files. So it isn't actually the code that needs to be changed, just the config.

I think the need for 4 weeks for a config change is the requirement to test the new config in a simulator (against a long list of scenarios) and have it reviewed and approved by various engineering teams, both Boeing and NASA. Plus likely some margin added.

[supportengineer]

In school we learned this is called a “trial balloon”

[MetaWhirledPeas]

> NASA just letting everyone get used to the idea before they formally commit to it

Or NASA caving to outside pressure to look, relook, and look once more for any possible way to make a Starliner return possible. Likely the same pressure that called for Starliner in the first place.

[jwineinger]

I wonder if the astronauts themselves get some say in this. What if they decide, since it is their lives, that they're not getting into the starliner, even if NASA decides the risk is acceptable?

[khuey]

At the end of the day NASA administrators can't actually force the astronauts into Starliner. Clearly they get some say in it if they're willing to push hard enough.

[dave78]

I'm sure if they have opinions they would share them with NASA and probably their families, and of course if it comes out that NASA ignored their concerns and they perished that would be pretty bad.

However, I imagine that part of becoming an astronaut means that you really have to get comfortable with trusting others to make critical, ultimately life-affecting decisions on your behalf all the time. So perhaps their mindset is more of "we trust that all the smart people on the ground are doing their best to make the safest decision for us, and we'll go with what you say".

If I were one of them stuck up there, though, I'd probably want to get on a video call with the Boeing engineers and look them in the eyes, show them pictures of my family, and ask if they are confident their vehicle will bring me home safely.

[gonzo41]

NASA just letting everyone get used to the idea before they formally commit to it.

If they are doing comms like that, it's telling, they need to cut it out and focus on their real issues.

[wmf]

NASA's real issue is, and has been for decades, not getting their funding taken away. Not embarrassing themselves is a big part of that.

[tomohawk]

NASA chose to give 2/3rds of the funding to ULA, and seemed pretty reluctant to include SpaceX - it seemed like they were forced to at the time.

They mismanaged the space shuttle, racking up huge costs on a vehicle that put people's lives at risk, while lying to congress and everyone else about how reliable it was. Feynman's report is a good read. Here's an HN thread.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10989483

[lupusreal]

I hope you're right, but at the same time it would be quite sad if this is all theatrics to preserve the feelings of Boeing fanboys (how do those still exist?)

[Hinermad]

> Boeing fanboys (how do those still exist?)

There are still fans of Boeing's ability to make money, no matter how bad they are at making aerospace products.

[hotstickyballs]

They exist because Boeing gives their voters jobs.

[renewiltord]

They exist because “real engineering” is something people think ex-software people can’t do. And because some people have a reflexive dislike of Elon Musk.

This is real engineering, folks. By the experienced real engineers at Boeing. Not the idiots at SpaceX whose stuff keeps blowing up.

[adamsb6]

I doubt Boeing fanboys are part of the equation.

NASA is an executive agency, the President doesn’t like the head of SpaceX, and it’s an election year.

[JumpCrisscross]

> NASA is an executive agency, the President doesn’t like the head of SpaceX

NASA is a huge fan of SpaceX. Look at the Artemis programme and the amount of technology risk concentrated with them. They’d similarly defer to SpaceX if Crew Dragon had an issue.

[adamsb6]

NASA certainly is deeply entwined with SpaceX, but that relationship predates the Biden/Elon animosity.

Biden has the authority to say that he’s not going to give Elon this gloating opportunity ahead of the election.

Biden also has the authority to make SpaceX catch a seal, strap it to a board, and make it listen to rocket noise through headphones to see if it becomes distressed.

[JumpCrisscross]

Biden can also fire every right-leaning defence contractor. SpaceX is the darling child of American aerospace. If your media diet is saying anything to the contrary that’s the carrier signal.

[greenavocado]

Unfortunately, a couple astronauts dying isn't an existential crisis for NASA, especially considering their incompetence in the years after the WW2 German rocket scientists died off.

[actinium226]

The people making this decision are not 5 year olds. They're not "letting everyone get used to the idea." That may be a nice side benefit of their decision process but the driver is crew safety and data on thruster performance. If they find a rationale for the failures that makes them confident in Starliner they'll use it. That's what the delay is about, not "letting everyone get used to the idea."

[WaitWaitWha]

I want to agree, alas cannot.

I would like to believe you, unfortunately previous events show that decisions are not driven primarily by crew safety and data on thruster performance. Politics plays heavily in most decisions.

(e.g., the Shuttle was sold to Congress as a multipurpose vehicle that could support military, scientific, and commercial missions. However, the need to gain political support led to compromises in its design, particularly the decision to make it a reusable vehicle with an orbiter that could carry large payloads, which led to safety issues. The political drive for cost-effectiveness also led to the program being underfunded, contributing to the Challenger disaster in 1986.

The 'Journey to Mars' program was designed to sustain NASA's long-term goals but lacked a clear timeline, partly due to political hesitance to commit to a specific date or strategy that might not align with subsequent administrations' priorities. The program was influenced by political leaders' desires to show progress in space exploration while avoiding the high costs and risks associated with a definitive Mars mission plan.)

[svnt]

In PR terms they are managing the Overton window. As a strategy it is sometimes called gradualism or incrementalism.

Five-year-olds do not use this technique, they do what they want when they want to with no regard for their public image, which is what you are stating NASA will do.

[actinium226]

I don't see why NASA would need to manage any "Overton window." NASA loses very little if they decide to send the astronauts back on SpaceX. At worst, and this is very possible, Boeing uses this as an excuse to just ax Starliner, and NASA would be left without a secondary crew vehicle, but they won't lose funding, and their image would probably only go up since they would have made a choice in the interest of safety.

Boeing, on the other hand, stands to suffer a lot of PR and financial damage should NASA make that decision. They have an interest in managing this window. They've been lobbying NASA and tweeted something about how confident they are in Starliner, but they appear to really be on the backfoot.

The whole point is that NASA isn't "letting people get used to the idea." It's really no skin off NASA's back if they send them home on Starliner.

[mattw2121]

They may not be 5 year olds, but they understand the general public are 5 year olds and may be setting a message to account for that.

[actinium226]

They don't answer to the general public.