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by loudmax
681 days ago
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Cryptography lets you certify attestation. So an organization can certify that an image is legitimate, and you can cryptographically verify that this organization has indeed certified that this is a legit image. That's it. It doesn't verify that the image itself is real, only that some organization has put their stamp of approval on the image. You can verify that the image wasn't tampered with between when they approved of it and it got to you, but you can't verify that the image was real to begin with. On principle, you could build a chain of certification into the camera itself but this strikes me as a losing battle because you could just stage whatever you want in front of the camera. The impetus then is on organizations to build that trust. |
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In that world wouldn't keys leak pretty easily? The key exists on the device. Is there a way this sort of stuff is actually viable? Or do i have the model entirely wrong?