You can say it (and if you use language persuasively, and repeat it often enough, you can even cause it to appear to be true [1], the effects of which can usually be seen in any thread like this), but you cannot say it soundly (known to be necessarily conclusive):
Plus, there are identifiable differences (disproving the "just as"): LLM's can reliably acknowledge epistemic unsoundness in their prior claims without aversion and rhetoric.
Your links do not support your conclusions (actually, I don't believe there are any in your comment). Yes, while you can repeat something often enough for it to appear true, it may not actually be true; this is a vacuous statement that does not need to be stated. My comment about LLMs are generally analogistic, they are not meant to be taken concretely on current implementations.
You have not actually answered my question however, your comment is a deflection of what I'm asking, so I will ask again, why are biological beings not considered computational? They do the same thing a general computer can do. And again, by "computer," I do not necessarily mean silicon-based, Von Neumann architecture computers.
> Your links do not support your conclusions (actually, I don't believe there are any in your comment).
1. What a strange comment.
2. They do support my answer to your question: "how one cannot say that biological machines compute "just as"(!) silicon based computers do"
> Yes, while you can repeat something often enough for it to appear true, it may not actually be true; this is a vacuous statement that does not need to be stated
It is directly related to your question, and the underlying phenomenon: human belief (more popularly known as: truth, the reality, etc).
> You have not actually answered my question however, your comment is a deflection of what I'm asking, so I will ask again, why are biological beings not considered computational?
"I am asking in the general sense how one cannot say that biological machines compute just as silicon based computers do."
That is the question I answered.
As for "Why are biological beings not considered computational?"
Well, consciousness (which implements "considering") is not understood, so it is unknown. But as my last link above describes, instances of can be made to function certain ways simply by good story telling. So in this case, maybe some chunk of the whole have heard that they are not computational.
> They do the same thing a general computer can do.
The ambiguity and misinformative of English (as we (or at least I) see here) is why I linked to Set Theory. Do you see the relevance?
You have not actually answered my question however, your comment is a deflection of what I'm asking, so I will ask again, why are biological beings not considered computational? They do the same thing a general computer can do. And again, by "computer," I do not necessarily mean silicon-based, Von Neumann architecture computers.