Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by jitl 701 days ago
The article seems to be entirely speculative. Why decide the channel files are executable code, without any first-hand investigation?
2 comments

Yes, my article is pretty much speculation - in the absence of a proper explanation by CrowdStrike. (Now there actually is sort of an explanation, but it raises almost as many questions as before). I don't have data for a first hand investigation, but do cite the investigation by Dave Plummer - which of course also contains quite a bit of speculation.

Whether or not "Rapid Response Content" and "Template Instances" are Turing complete is unclear, but the fact of the matter is that according to CrowdStrike "problematic content in Channel File 291 resulted in an out-of-bounds memory read triggering an exception", so the interpretation of the content is at least fairly complex. CrowdStrike also states that "Each Template Instance maps to specific behaviors for the sensor to observe, detect or prevent", and mentions a "Content Interpreter". Whether it's code or configuration data is not really relevant though, the point is that it's interpreted by a kernel mode driver which did not have sufficient validation of it's "Content" to prevent the crash.

They don't have to actually be executable. They are config that affects the way the code behaves. In fact its pointed out in TFA that the file was just all 0s so right now in order to prevent a machine with crowdstrike from booting you just have to above a file of all 0s in the right folder.