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by sudosysgen 705 days ago
> The phrase "root kit powered endpoint surveillance" is a mischaracterization, often fueled by misconceptions from the gaming community.

How exactly is this is mischaracterization? Technically these EDR tools are identical to kernel level anticheat and they are identical to rootkits, because fundamentally they're all the same thing just with a different owner. If you disagree it would be nice if you explained why.

As for open source EDRs becoming the target, this is just as true of closed source EDR. Cortex for example was hilariously easy to exploit for years and years until someone was nice enough to tell them as much. This event from CrowdStrike means that it's probably just as true here.

The fact that the EDR is 90% of the work of attacking a Windows network isn't a sign that we should continue using EDRs. It means that nothing privileged should be in a Windows network. This isn't that complicated, I've administered such a network where everything important was on Linux while end users could run Windows clients, and if anything it's easier than doing a modern Windows/AD deployment. Good luck pivoting from one computer to another when they're completely isolated through a Linux server you have no credentials for. No endpoint should have any credentials that are valid anywhere except on the endpoint itself and no two endpoints should be talking to each other directly: this is in fact not very restrictive to end users and completely shuts down lateral movement - it's a far better solution than convoluted and insecure EDR schemes that claim to provide zero-trust but fundamentally can't, while following this simple rule actually provides you zero-trust.

Look at it this way - if you (and other redteamers) can economically get past EDR systems for the cost of a pentest, what do you think competent hackers with economies of scale and million dollar payouts can do? For now there's enough systems without EDRs that many just won't bother, but as it spread more they will just be exploited more. This is true as well of the technical analogue in kernel anticheat, which you and I can bypass in a couple days of work.

Where we are is that we're using EDRs as a patch over a fundamentally insecure security model in a misguided attempt to keep the convenience that insecurity brings.

1 comments

Mischaracterization is a quite a good term to use

People don't go around complaining that Microsoft Defender is "rootkit powered endpoint surveillance". It's intent is to protect the system.

There is a lot more suspicion around kernel level anti-cheat software developed by the likes of Epic games due to their ownership than they Crowdstrike or Microsoft.

People don't complain about kernel code from Microsoft because Microsoft wrote the kernel. You don't have a choice but to trust Microsoft with that.

People have been complaining about rootkit powered antimalware for a long time. It didn't start with CrowdStrike: there was a whole debacle about it in the Windows XP days when Microsoft stopped antiviruses from patching the kernel.