| > Open sourcing them increases the risk of attackers contributing malicious code to slow down development or introduce vulnerabilities. This is a such tired non-sequitur argument with no evidence whatsoever to back it up that the risk is actually higher for open source versus closed source. I can just easily argue that a state or non-state actor could buy[1], bribe or simply threaten to get weak code in a proprietary system, without users having any means to ever find out. On the other hand, it is always easier(easier not easy) to discover compromise in open-source like it happened with xz[2] and verify such reports independently. If there is no proof that compromise is less likely with closed source and it is far easier to discover them in open-source, the logical conclusion is simply open source is better for security libraries. Funding defensive security infrastructure which is open source and freely available for everyone to use even with 1/100th of the NSA budget that is effectively only offensive, would improve info-security enormously for everyone not just from nation state actors, but also from scammers etc. Instead we get companies like CS that have enormous vested interest in seeing that never happens and trying to scare the rest of us that open-source is bad for security. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XZ_Utils_backdoor |
Eventually that's something that gets exposed anyways, but I think the crucial part is timing and being a few steps ahead in the cat and mouse game. Otherwise I'm not sure what kind of proof would even be meaningful here.