[smsm42]

The problem here would be that there's not enough people who can provide the level of protection a third-party vendor claims to provide, and a person (or persons) with comparable level of expertise would be much more expensive likely. So companies who do their own IT would be routinely outcompeted by ones that outsource, only for the latter to get into trouble when the black swan swoops in. The problem is all other kinds of companies are mostly extinct by then unless their investors had some super-human foresight and discipline to invest for years into something that year after year looks like losing money.

[brightlancer]

> The problem here would be that there's not enough people who can provide the level of protection a third-party vendor claims to provide, and a person (or persons) with comparable level of expertise would be much more expensive likely.

Is that because of economies of scale or because the vendor is just cutting costs while hiding their negligence?

I don't understand how a single vendor was able to deploy an update to all of these systems virtually simultaneously, and _that_ wasn't identified as a risk. This smells of mindless box checking rather than sincere risk assessment and security auditing.

[smsm42]

Kinda both I think, with an addition of principal agent problem. If you found a formula that provides the client with an acceptable CYA picture it is very scalable. And the model of "IT person knowledgeable in both security, modern threats and company's business" is not very scalable. The former, as we now know, is prone to catastrophic failures, but those are rare enough for a particular decision-maker to not be bothered by it.

[downrightmike]

the vendor is just cutting costs while hiding their negligence?

That's how it works.

[yeauldfellows]

Depressing thought that this phenomena is some kind of Nash equilibrium. That in the space of competition between firms, the equilibrium is for companies to outsource IT labor, saving on IT costs and passing that cost savings onto whatever service they are providing. -> Firms that outsource, out-compete their competition + expose their services to black swan catastrophic risk. Is regulation that only way out of this, from a game theory perspective?

[slow_typist]

Depressing, but a good way to think about it.

The whole market in which crowdstrike can exist is a result of regulation, albeit bad regulation.

And since the returns of selling endpoint protection are increasing with volume, the market can, over time, only be an oligopoly or monopoly.

It is a screwed market with artificially increased demand.

Also the outsourcing is not only about cost and compliance. There is at least a third force. In a situation like this, no CTO who bought crowdstrike products will be blamed. He did what was considered best industry practice (box ticking approach to security). From their perspective it is risk mitigation.

In theory, since most of the security incidents (not this one) involve the loss of personal customer data, if end customers would be willing to a pay a premium for proper handling of their data, AND if firms that don’t outsource and instead pay for competent administrators within their hierarchy had a means of signaling that, the equilibrium could be pushed to where you would like it to be.

Those are two very questionable ifs.

Also how do you recognise a competent administrator (even IT companies have problems with that), and how many are available in your area (you want them to live in the vicinity) even if you are willing to pay them like the most senior devs?

If you want to regulate the problem away, a lot of influencing factors have to be considered.

[stolsvik]

It has been exactly the same with outsourcing production to China...