[soist]

I am familiar with the computational theory of cognition. What I wanted to know was whether there were any people who actually claimed their thinking is nothing more than programmed computation. I am very curious to know if they have mapped out the instruction set for their mind along the lines of something like the SKI combinators.

[kybernetikos]

A mental instruction set would be extremely interesting. Unfortunately, nobody has that level of understanding of brain processes (and it might be quite difficult to formulate in such a linear way since the underlying mechanism is so very parallel), but the idea that human cognition is computable falls pretty naturally out of the idea that nature is computable which I think is a common position (sometimes called the Church Turing Deutsch principle).

[soist]

Yes, I understand why some scientists claim that nature is "just" some computer but no one still has given an answer to my very basic question: what is the instruction set that the people who claim they are computers are using to think? Surely there must be one if they are nothing more than programmable computers as they claim.

[vidarh]

Why do you think there would need to be an instruction set? And why do you think we'd need to know of one to conclude we're all computers?

[soist]

Just trying to figure out how rigorously people have thought about this. A computer with an undefined instruction set seems somewhat useless as a computer.

[vidarh]

Whether or not we can discern an instruction set is entirely orthogonal to whether or not something can compute.

[soist]

Oh I see, so it's magic.

[kybernetikos]

Rule 110 doesn't have a clearly defined instruction set but is known to be Turing complete.

[soist]

Rule 110 can be specified with a rewrite system, also known as cellular automata: https://arxiv.org/abs/0906.3248. Cellular automatons have a correspondence with contextual grammars: https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~cis5110/notes/tcbook-lang.pdf. Each is equivalent to a Turing machine, another way of saying that there is a program for it which can be specified on a Turing machine with the usual Turing machine instruction set for writing, reading, and erasing binary digits on a tape. This usual program can then be "compiled" into a rewrite system corresponding to the instruction set for rule 110.

The reason rule 110 is said to be Turing complete is because someone went through the trouble of specifying an instruction set for rule 110 so that other people could verify that it would be possible to write programs with it. This is not the case for the people who claim that they are computers. They always leave the instruction set undefined which makes their claims hard to believe.

I personally have no problem with people who think they're computers but if they're not programmable then I'm not sure what the point would be of calling themselves computers.

[prometheus76]

And wouldn't that language need to be able to account for different physiological states? Thinking when one is hungry or sleepy is quite different than thinking when one is well-fed or fully rested.

[soist]

Yes. To validate the claim would require not only a formal instruction set but also the code to account for all sorts of cognitive states and processes. I'm not ruling out that some people are indeed programmable computers but I would like to see some actual evidence presented by the people who make these claims about themselves.