[hansvm]

There necessarily exists a period of time between when the photo was taken and it was certified though. Outside of tainting every photo (IRL watermarks somehow?) or every device (not that this _won't_ happen, but if the industry heavyweights behind DRM have only gotten it this far then I don't have a lot of faith in some signing scheme being the final straw), every photo you would want to certify must at some point be untrusted.

Given that fact, the most you could prove is that some individual claims to be the original source, not that the image is worth a damn, right? If so, what exactly does a "crypto" solution add (we can already sign images and publish timestamped hashes)?

[makeitdouble]

There are dedicated apps (for insurance companies etc.) that will certify the photo by taking it straight from the camera feed and sign it.

That still allows to shoot fake subjects. Let's say you build the image on a high resolution screen and shoot it from the app with low resolution, you get a certified fake photo. Making the room too dark for good ISO, or purposefully shake the phone for instance should be enough to significantly lower the details if the app accepts the shot.

But at least, part of the pipeline is secured, in the sheer "this photo was not edited afterwards" sense.

[CMCDragonkai]

Part of truth is socially mediated. No picture is the "truth" as you say, all cameras edit the photo. What matters is what the photo means and that's always a social question. Crypto governance and consensus is one way we are exploring how to represent truth in the internet.