[JumpCrisscross]

> many of the instruments that actually trade are derivative or abstract representations of actual assets with 'real' value

They’re all derivative.

> the notion of 'legal' can get very fuzzy when you're talking about an industry with so many private/self-interested entities

Sure. You’re describing ambiguity outside securities trading.

> more about the SEC's role or dereliction of duty in the Enron case

I asked for one example of something the SEC had a mandate to do that it didn’t.

[rschneid]

The SEC has a three-part mission: to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.

These mandates are, of course, subjective and vague enough to be interpreted a variety of ways whether you view 'investors' as institutions, households, individuals, etc... What you define as 'fair/orderly/efficient', and what meaningful 'capital formation' really is.

When SEC approved Enron's change in account reporting practices from historical cost to mtm, I would argue that the SEC failed it's mandate to protect investors by allowing disingenuously optimistic instrument valuations. You could argue that eventually the SEC fulfilled its mandate by recovering much of the misappropriate funds, but it's hard to say they didn't also facilitate the disorder in approving these instruments given how that story concludes with a corporate collapse and flurry of regulation...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes%E2%80%93Oxley_Act

[JumpCrisscross]

> When SEC approved Enron's change in account reporting practices from historical cost to mtm, I would argue that the SEC failed it's mandate to protect investors by allowing disingenuously optimistic instrument valuations

In a broad sense, sure. But that means making the SEC both an auditor and determiner of fair value. Even after the ensuing flurry of rule making, that is very much not part of the SEC’s remit.

There is a reasonable debate to be had around whether it should be. But the SEC not double checking auditors is not evidence of its lawlessness.

[rschneid]

The financial markets are more than the SEC but the SEC is part of the financial markets. Evidence of the SEC's imperfect lawlessness implies the greater financial markets are also, in part, lawless.

But my point wasn't even to say whether a given industry as broad as finance is 'lawless' or not, that's your sweeping strawman. I was just saying that in Finance of ALL industries, the line between lawful and illegal has been, and continues to be literally, morally and philosophically blurry...

[JumpCrisscross]

> Evidence of the SEC's imperfect lawlessness implies the greater financial markets are also, in part, lawless

By this logic lawlessness anywhere means lawlessness everywhere.

> my point wasn't even to say whether a given industry as broad as finance is 'lawless' or not

You said the “lawlessness of finance is so pervasive that it has effectively become legalized” [1]. You cited the SEC in respect of Enron as an example. I “asked for one example of something the SEC had a mandate to do that it didn’t” do with Enron. You ignored the question and started pontificating on not the law but legal philosophy.

You continue to evade that first question. Now you’re claiming you didn’t make the first statement.

This is arguing in bad faith.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40890110

[rschneid]

To maybe help you alleviate a small bit of your presumably nearly overwhelming confusion I will repeat my reply to your SEC question[1], if that is indeed the 'first' one you ambiguously refer to.

> When SEC approved Enron's change in account reporting practices from historical cost to mtm, I would argue that the SEC failed it's mandate to protect investors by allowing disingenuously optimistic instrument valuations

I'm not sure what about that you think is evasive but I'd like to end the conversation here regardless.

[1][Whats] one example of something the SEC had a mandate to do that it didn’t.