[sornen]

Chalmers in point 2 is not saying to imagine such a world, but that such a world is logically possible. Chalmers gives as an example of a logical impossibility a male vixen since it is contradictory. He states "... a flying telephone is conceptually coherent, if a little out of the ordinary, so a flying telephone is logically possible. Nevertheless, that zombies are logically possible, may be begging the question, that consciousness is non physical.

[tsimionescu]

But it's not logically possible if consciousness is a material process, a consequence of computation in the human brain (and potentially other places). So you can't prove that consciousness is not materialistic by assuming it's not materialistic.

[tasty_freeze]

I'm still missing the point, I guess, as I don't think the question is logically possible.

One might as well say: it is logically possible to have a universe where the physics are identical to our present world, except the core of the Sun is chocolate... therefore fusion can't be the explanation for why our Sun radiates so much energy.

Getting back to the zombies, presuming there could be a zombie clone of me which is indistinguishable from the real me but it isn't conscious is one that needs far more support than just asserting it. I've heard people try to explain: well, imagine if a powerful computer was simulating you in every respect, that would be a p-zombie. But that is question begging, as it presumes that such a creature wouldn't be conscious.

I feel the same way about Searle's Chinese Room -- the power of the argument is there only if you have already decided that consciousness is mystical.

[idiotsecant]

I have known some pretty vixen-y males...