| > The term agent has been used by AI researchers without a formal definition [1] > [1] In traditional AI, agents are defined entities that perceive and act upon their environment, but that definition is less useful in the LLM era — even a thermostat would qualify as an agent under that definition. I'm a huge believer in the power of agents, but this kind of complete ignorance of the history of AI gets frustrating. This statement belies a gross misunderstanding of how simple agents have been viewed. If you're serious about agents then Minsky's The Society of the Mind should be on your desk. From the opening chapter: > We want to explain intelligence as a combination of simpler things. This means that we must be sure to check, at every step, that none of our agents is, itself, intelligent... Accordingly, whenever we find that an agent has to do anything complicated, we'll replace it with a subsociety of agents that do simpler things. Instead this write up completely ignores the logic of one of the seminal writings on this topic (and it's okay to disagree with Minsky, I sure do, but you need to at least acknowledge this) and immediately thinks the future of agents must be immensely complex. Automatic thermostats existed in the early days of research on agents, and the key to a thermostat being an agent is it's ability to communicate with other agents automatically, and collectively perform complex actions. |
Also the thermostat has been extremely usefully used in an exploration of agency by Daniel Dennett, in his famous "The Intentional Stance"
(I accidentally typed "Intensional Stance" which really would be a fascinating book to read!)