[cryptonector]

This is not about delegation. This is about interpretation of the limits of delegated power. Under Chevron the executive agencies decided that without check. Before Chevron and after Raimondo it's the courts that decide. The 40 years of Chevron were an aberration.

[autoexec]

> Under Chevron the executive agencies decided that without check.

That isn't even close to being the truth. Under Chevron congress was always free to pass statutes as detailed as they want to avoid the kind of ambiguities that would even apply to Chevron in the first place, and judges have always had the oversight to ensure that an agency's interpretation was a "permissible construction of the statute".

Those are two literal checks. I have no idea where you ever got the idea that executive agencies were "without check" but that is just plainly wrong.

"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."

[throw0101b]

> The 40 years of Chevron were an aberration.

The Chevron ruling was codifying what was already happening for decades:

> When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natura...

There is plenty of oversight in interpretation and Congress does not need to micromanage interpretation or implementation. Delegation as a principle of government pre-dates the formation of the US with Ministers of the Crown, and was continued post-formation as that's why there are Secretarys of Department X/Y/Z or Directors of Agency A/B/C.

The People (through their representative in Congress) are fine with agencies doing the interpretation. Those agencies are headed by an Executive of The People (President), and are run by administrator who are People-approved (through Congressional hearings and Senate approvals). The Legislative branch can dial up and dial down the flexibility of interpretation any time they want through Acts that change how the department/agency involved works, or through altering leadership (Secretarys, Directors) of the agencies.

[cryptonector]

Chevron codified what had been happening since the New Deal. Raimondo codifies what has been happening since Chevron! Pretty ironic. Each case was a bookend to the preceding trend.

[ytpete]

It wasn't really "without check" though, was it? Courts could still rule that an agency exceeded its authority, it's just that Chevron meant the courts had to give deference to the agency's interpretation if Congress left the law ambiguous – and if the agency's interpretation was "reasonable."

So for example, if a law grants an agency power to regulate pollution emitted into the air, the agency already couldn't simply decide on its own that it was also able to regulate toxins dumped into rivers. But it could decide, if the law was vague on this point, whether "emitted into the air" included car exhaust vs. only stationary factories, for example.

The principle was that if Congress left a definition or meaning ambiguous in the law, it's implied that defining its precise meaning is part of the regulatory work they wanted the agency to do. Now, instead of that principle, the meaning of every ambiguity is open for litigation to select a different interpretation if the court finds it preferable to the agency's.

[pclmulqdq]

It pretty much was "without check" unless the action was facially against the text of the governing statute for the agency.

Your example about pollution in the air and in the water is actually close to a good one: The EPA decided recently that they had power over CO2 emissions because of some very mild toxicity, even though that's not the reason why anyone wants to control CO2 emissions. They could easily have argued in your scenario that toxin dumped in the water evaporates and ends up in the air, so it's in their purview, and it might not be wrong under Chevron.

[rhaksw]

It's more clear if you use the word vest and divest rather than delegation. Congress cannot divest its own legislative powers, nor can it vest them in another branch.