[mike_hearn]

It's worth reading the judgement itself. The court has indeed voted to give the courts more power, but not on the basis of nothing. It did so because it views it as taking back powers that were incorrectly/lazily given up without basis in what Congress wanted. From the judgement:

Congress in 1946 enacted the APA [Administrative Procedures Act] “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 644. The APA prescribes procedures for agency action and delineates the basic contours of judicial review of such action. And it codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions by applying their own judgment. As relevant here, the APA specifies that courts, not agencies, will decide “all relevant questions of law” arising on review of agency action, 5 U. S. C. §706 (emphasis added)—even those involving ambiguous laws. It prescribes no deferential standard for courts to employ in answering those legal questions, despite mandating deferential judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding

[bumby]

This feels like one of those topics that may sound ok in theory, but breaks down in practice. The implication is that the judges must be well-versed enough in any domain brought before them to interpret the laws effectively. This seems like a tall order for nine people. We have already seen this trouble in expecting strict interpretations regarding tech.

To be fair, Congress has the same problem. I believe that was in large part the impetus for giving the agencies discretion. They have a better chance of having the depth of expertise to craft effective regulations.

[mike_hearn]

The Supreme Court doesn't resolve cases directly, they resolve questions of law for lower courts to take into account. They are meant to be experts in law, so there's no problem there. The lower courts can't be experts in everything, but bear in mind two things:

1. Courts have expert witnesses and a whole system around how they are called, challenged and questioned. Judges are trained to learn what they need to know from witnesses.

2. Good court systems do have expert judges they can draw on.

I recently took part in the Craig Wright case in the UK as a witness. Wright forged enormous quantities of evidence and proving the forgeries often required deep technical knowledge about file metadata, how computers worked etc. Fortunately the judge was deeply technical himself, being often a judge on complex patent cases, and had no difficulty with any of the complexities.

[bumby]

It reads like it creates a deliberate impasse. The opinion states that ambiguities in law no longer implicitly give agencies discretion. That means Congress has to write unambiguous laws. But my original post acknowledges they cannot. Based on this ruling, it seems like anything other than a perfect, airtight law means it's effectively non-enforceable. So where does that leave us? It seems like the SC has laid the table for constant rules-lawyering by corporations to get whatever they want. In other words, they've let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

[mike_hearn]

> That means Congress has to write unambiguous laws

I don't understand where this belief is coming from. The judgement explicitly states that writing unambiguous laws isn't possible. There will still be ambiguous laws, and those ambiguities will still be resolved. The only matter being decided on is who gets to resolve ambiguities - is it the agencies or is it the courts.

Let's put this another way. Did Congress have to write unambiguous laws or have them be unenforceable before 1984? Clearly not. The Constitution itself is ambiguous on many points. Do other countries, which lack any equivalent of Chevron deference, have to write unambiguous laws or have them be unenforceable? Again, clearly not.

[bumby]

>The only matter being decided on is who gets to resolve ambiguities - is it the agencies or is it the courts.

I think we are agreeing here. I think the distinction is that I'm claiming the courts would need (yet don't have) the expertise to clear up ambiguities in such domains. Where do I get this claim? From the justices themselves.[1] There is evidence they are overly confident in their understanding when "doing their own research" on a domain outside their expertise.[2]

So given that context, it's probably a bad idea to have justices decide on ambiguities. But if that power resides in them now, it means the only way to have effective laws is to avoid ambiguities in the first place. That's why I stated that is now on Congress. However, the court is also acknowledging that isn't possible. That's why I originally said it reads like they created a deliberate stalemate. From the court we have the following:

1) Congress cannot be expected to create unambiguous laws.

2) It is the court's job to resolve ambiguities.

3) The court lacks domain expertise.

I'm claiming those set up a natural conflict because expertise is necessary to effectively resolve ambiguity.

The most generous interpretation is that the justices don't need to know the details of the domain expertise, but rather just need to know how it interfaces with people and the law.[3] I'm pretty skeptical of that leading to good outcomes in complex, nuanced situations. I don't think we can pretend law is abstractly disconnected from the complex systems it regulates. As society progresses, most things get more complex so I expect the problem to get worse, not better.

[1] https://www.businessinsider.com/supreme-court-google-tech-so...

[2] https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-court-errors-are-...

[3] https://www.vox.com/2014/4/23/5644154/the-supreme-courts-tec...

[mike_hearn]

Remember that law is first and foremost meant to be read by ordinary people, as they are the ones expected to know it and follow it. Ignorance of the law is not an excuse, etc. If a law is so difficult that even a judge armed with a courtroom full of expert witnesses can't figure out what it means it should not exist, because how could any actual citizen be expected to understand or obey it? People who write such laws don't get to whinge when other people try to clean up their mess.

There's certainly no evidence of an attempt to create a deliberate stalemate here, as "laws that judges cannot interpret even with help" isn't something the Supreme Court is going to consider a legitimate problem to begin with so why would they consider it? But it's fascinating the degree to which some people on this thread are sure this is all a cunning secret plan by the justices to advance a political ideology. Projection, much?

> There is evidence they are overly confident in their understanding when "doing their own research" on a domain outside their expertise.[2]

Great. So are regulators, politicians and especially journalists. The idea that agencies never rely on bogus claims or statistics is a deeply romantic view.

Really, I don't have any sympathy for the US regulatory agencies on this issue. Too many of them have a history of abusing Chevron deference. If the deference standard had any advantage at all it'd be that you could get binding rulings from regulators ahead of time, without needing to actually end up in court first. But regulators always refuse to do that, because they aren't obliged to and it would reduce their options. Instead what they do is make vague rules, tell citizens (e.g. entrepreneurs) who ask for clarification to get lost, wait years for some of those people to make successful businesses and then decide that what they were doing had been illegal all along under some strange interpretation of the relevant rule. It's a form of retroactive lawmaking, which is forbidden by basically any constitution because the whole point of law is that people are meant to be able to follow it.

This sort of abusive behavior is so common it's clearly deliberate. Instead of helping society, the agencies end up working against it in order to maximize their own power.

Having the people who interpret laws be fully separated from those who write the laws aligns incentives properly: there's no longer any benefit to passing maximally vague or contradictory rules in the hope of being able to do whatever you want later. Laws that are as specific and clear as possible is exactly what a society needs to succeed, because when the rules are clear people are free to innovate and do business without fear.

[thfuran]

>Courts have expert witnesses and a whole system around how they are called, challenged and questioned.

Yes, but this is a system where everyone involved is trying to (help their team) win rather than trying to produce generally efficacious policy.

[SllX]

Well they’re not trying to produce any policy. A District court is trying to resolve a case brought before them.

[thfuran]

Yes, that's my point. An agency interpreting the law that governs their mandate is at least nominally trying to do so in a manner that yields effective policy, but that's not really a goal of the courts, so letting the courts defer to the agencies probably will produce better policy then leaving it up to case law.

[mike_hearn]

> An agency interpreting the law that governs their mandate is at least nominally trying to do so in a manner that yields effective policy

Ideally. In practice ambiguities in statutes governing agency mandates are always interpreted by agencies in whatever way would maximize their own options and power. That's the written justification for the APA in the first place: reeling in excessive "zeal" amongst administrators.

The courts don't get powers from the law directly (except meta-powers like the one this case is about), so there's no direct benefit to judges from interpreting law in a maximally agency-advantageous way. That's why countries (not just the US) have courts resolve ambiguous law. It's a core part of their job.

[SllX]

Yeah, but giving too much deference to agencies is also a recipe for peoples' rights to be trampled by a regulatory agency acting unlawfully. Acting in accordance with their policy goals is fine and all, but they still have to do so within the bounds of the law and if they're losing at the District level because they can't rely on Chevron deference anymore, I mean, that's completely fine. Go back to Congress.

Despite its reputation for not passing any laws, the last session of Congress still passed a fair number of laws: https://legiscan.com/US/legislation/2021?status=passed

(The current one seems to be a fair bit behind, but it is also operating on razor thin vote margins and the session is not over yet).

[suzzer99]

I just to work for one of the leading expert witnesses in the country. Expert witnesses are just advocates, hired by a client, who know how to throw fancy words around in a soothing, confident manner that makes the listener feel smart.

[TimTheTinker]

That's a rather cynical take.

An abuse of a form doesn't invalidate that form's validity.

I would be logically incoherent to assert that all hamburgers are crap on the basis of having worked at McDonalds for years.

[suzzer99]

It's not abuse of the form. It is the form.

Nobody has a career as an expert witness for long if they go against a client's wishes. There is no such thing as an impartial expert witness in the current system. They're all hired by one side or the other. They're basically subject-matter expert lawyers.

[TimTheTinker]

> It's not abuse of the form. It is the form.

> There is no such thing as an impartial expert witness in the current system

You're saying a form is bad because it doesn't line up with how it ought to be (you said "impartial"). But in saying so, you imply there is an ought. That is the real form (what it ought to be): an impartial expert witness.

When a form only presently exists in an abuse thereof, that doesn't necessarily invalidate the form as a worthy pursuit.

History can tell us whether such a form is worth pursuing. Expert witnesses in the US have been more or less impartial in the past. Communism has never been achieved, and its pursuit has never led to well-being of the people. Both are "ideal forms" in a philosophical sense, but history bears out which is worth pursuing and practically achievable.

So my take is that what's needed is reform of expert testimony through congressional law, including independent review of DAs, to ensure they prosecute expert witnesses who failed a legal impartiality test.

[Gormo]

> This feels like one of those topics that may sound ok in theory, but breaks down in practice. The implication is that the judges must be well-versed enough in any domain brought before them to interpret the laws effectively

No -- subject matter expertise is not relevant per se, as what is being evaluated in these cases is not whether the policy advanced by a given agency is sound on its technical merits or factual basis, but whether it is within the bounds of the authority granted to that agency by the applicable statutes.

The courts aren't concerned with "crafting effective regulations", they are concerned with ensuring that the people who are tasked with doing so are operating consistently with prevailing statute law and the constitution.

And, considering that the judiciary is staffed with the world's foremost experts in statutory interpretation and constitutional law, this arrangement makes sure that all of the disparate facets of the process are being undertaken by the most qualified people available.

It's not appropriate to make officials who are hired on the basis of their knowledge of medicine, RF transmission, economics, etc. to bear the entire burden of determining the complex legalities of their authority. They have to step far outside their field of expertise and engage in textual analysis of statutory law or delve deep into constitutional theory to determine whether their rule-making process is indeed legally permissible. It's better to let the courts do their job here and tell them when they are out of line, so they can focus on doing their own jobs properly.

[bumby]

Maybe I’m misunderstanding, but what you’re describing sounds like what I thought the case was before this ruling. The courts were deciding on the reasonableness of the agency interpretation. Now it sounds like the court is interpreting directly. To do the latter effectively, I still maintain you need a solid expert understanding of the domain.

It sounds like we disagree on who is better equipped to make the kinds of interpretations necessary for effective policy. Like I said in another post, I don’t think we can pretend law can be abstracted and cleaved from the systems it regulates. The court admits they don’t have expertise in those systems. That makes me feel they are ill-equipped for the types of interpretations.

[mike_hearn]

What you had understood and what he's describing is the situation pre-1984 and now post this judgement.

I think a lot of the reason this thread has blown up is that the Chevron doctrine was really very strange and not at all how you'd expect the US legal system to have been working. It doesn't line up with any standard teaching of civics, for instance. The Supreme Court clearly felt the same way and has now instructed courts to go back to doing what everyone thought they were doing already.

[bumby]

I don’t know that I agree. It’s exactly the understanding I was given from an engineering law course, for example. Prior to this ruling, the regulatory agencies were given latitude to interpret ambiguous law as long as they were determined reasonable by the court. It’s also what I think most people understand, given the way people rail against agencies rather than statutes.

To be clear, I think there is a distinction between declaring if a law is constitutional and resolving ambiguities for non-constitutional, domain specific issues. I think the court is eminently qualified in one area, but much less so (by their own admission) in the other. I think those are two different aspects that often get conflated.

[Gormo]

Yes, you are misunderstanding. Chevron obligated the courts to defer to agencies' own internal interpretation of statute law whenever any ambiguity arose as to what the law said. Reversing Chevron has restored that function to the judiciary, where it belongs.

[bumby]

I’m not misunderstanding then. Chevron still deferred interpreting ambiguity to the agency, but the courts could still check that based on a reasonableness standard. Now the court gets both aspects. Our difference is that I think that is a less good outcome because I believe domain expertise is necessary to effectively clear up ambiguity and the court admits they do not have that kind of domain expertise.

I think the court should reserve power for constitutionality (their domain expertise) and leave resolving the ambiguity outside that to the regulatory experts of those respective domains.

[Gormo]

> I’m not misunderstanding then. Chevron still deferred interpreting ambiguity to the agency, but the courts could still check that based on a reasonableness standard.

No, you are definitely misunderstanding. Chevron delegated a core duty of the judiciary to executive branch officials with no expertise in that field. The "reasonableness" standard you was a limited and constrained version of reasonableness standards devised and applied by courts in normal statutory interpretation, and deprived the courts of the power to fully exercise their duty.

> Now the court gets both aspects.

No, there is only one aspect here.

> Our difference is that I think that is a less good outcome because I believe domain expertise is necessary to effectively clear up ambiguity and the court admits they do not have that kind of domain expertise.

The domain expertise of the regulators in the field of regulation is irrelevant here, because the cases that go before the court are not about what measures are likely to be effective in fulfilling the agency's mandate, it's about what measures are legally permissible.

> I think the court should reserve power for constitutionality (their domain expertise) and leave resolving the ambiguity outside that to the regulatory experts of those respective domains.

The only domain at question here is the domain of interpreting the law, and the relevant experts in that are the judiciary themselves. You are conflating together completely distinct matters.

[mcguire]

This is the Supreme Court that has repeatedly made subject-matter related arguments (particularly historical arguments) while ignoring the input of subject-matter experts.

[consumer451]

As a legal dilettante I have some questions: What does this decision mean for court caseload going forward? If it will increase, how much? Is there budget for that?

[mike_hearn]

It doesn't mean anything for court caseload.

There seem to be a lot of posts in this thread that are misinterpreting what the judgement means. Here's what I understood from reading it:

• This case does not affect Congress' ability to delegate defined lawmaking powers to the executive. Congress can continue to delegate whatever they want.

• It will therefore not have any impact on the speed with which the US government can pass laws.

• It does not award the courts any new powers.

• What it does is go back to the pre-1984 system in which the meaning of ambiguous rules were decided by the courts.

• It does so on the basis of a specific law called the APA, in which Congress spelled out that the courts should defer to agencies on matters of fact, but does not say courts should defer to agencies on how to interpret ambiguous law. Also that law was passed specifically to limit the powers of the executive. So, their ruling seems founded in the will of Congress.

Because ambiguous rules would have to be decided on anyway, and they were already being decided in the context of a court case, this won't affect the number of cases being decided.

I think the only way to attack this ruling would be to show that there was some law that superceded or replaced the APA, or that the relevant section of the APA itself was unconstitutional. But why would it be? As the court points out, the fact that ambiguous law is interpreted by the courts is a very old and unremarkable arrangement. The Chevron decision was the radical deviation from normal practice, reversing it just puts things back to how most people already think it works.

[Retric]

Case load is simply the number of active cases and therefore not limited to the number of cases but also includes how long each case takes to complete.

As this requires judges to consider a wider range of options it inherently means these cases will take longer thus increasing caseload. Further, it also means bringing these cases before the court will get more expensive as individual cases take longer.

[mike_hearn]

You're assuming that judges are slower to resolve ambiguities than regulators are. My experience with regulators has been that often they not only let the law be ambiguous for years despite repeated requests for them to make a decision, but are then fond of retroactively and suddenly "clarifying" things in response to shifting political/media winds. Nor do they feel any obligation to be consistent with past rulings.

Courts are at least expected to make progress on cases as they are brought, to be roughly consistent with past case law, and they aren't allowed to just refuse to make a decision for a decade and return to it when it's suddenly in the newspapers.

[Retric]

> My experience … rulings.

None of what you mention really applies to specific court cases.

A judge can either defer to the agency involved, or spend a while digging into the underlying intent etc. The second may be “Better” or “Worse”, but if nothing else the first is faster.

[throwup238]

> Nor do they feel any obligation to be consistent with past rulings.

Well, you're in luck with this court!

[skhunted]

It takes away power from the legislative and executive branches because it now requires an onerous level of specificity to regulate something. This decision will have lasting negative consequences.

[consumer451]

Another user has raised the other side of my question, while exaggerated, is this more accurate as to what will happen than the thrust of my original question? Do we need to increase the budget for Congressional aides?

> The Roberts Court just decided to increase Congress' workload 100000x

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40823343

meta: this has been one of the most interesting and educational threads in recent times. Three cheers for HN.

[mike_hearn]

No, again, I don't understand where commenters are getting this idea from. The ruling does not require laws to be unambiguous. It only changes who is responsible for resolving ambiguity (changes it back). The entire system will do about as much work as it was doing before. At a stretch, you could say that maybe some funding would need to be reallocated from regulators to the courts, but one would hope that "cost of interpreting ambiguous laws" is not a meaningfully large line item in the US government budget.

Now leaving the specific judgement aside for a second, IMHO - not worth much as an outsider - Congress certainly should write more precise laws and maybe hire more aides to help them do that. All governments could do better on that front. Clear law is worth its weight in gold for creating a stable and prosperous society because when people know what they can and cannot do it's less risk to create new companies, less risk to create new products, and less time is spent in courtrooms arguing disputes caused by ambiguity. A lot of people commenting on this thread seem to fear a general breakdown if lawmakers are required to do a better job of writing law, but my personal experience of regulation (limited but not zero) has been that laws that have gone via a parliament or Congress are already higher quality than administratively issued regulations. The idea that the former are written by incompetents and the latter by experts is an intuitive one, but doesn't seem to be borne out in practice.

Also, as a general aside, I think Americans should appreciate Congress more than they do. It's popular to take a dump on them but if you compare to other governments around the world US law is fairly high quality. A big part of the success of the US economy and tech industry is related to what Congress does and doesn't do. For example the DMCA was unpopular when it passed but it laid the foundation for the dominance of Silicon Valley today. Apparently most Americans like their own Congressman/woman even whilst feeling the institution itself does a bad job, but this may just reflect the fact that America is very large and diverse, so inevitably a talking shop where people from different parts spend all day disagreeing with each other will seem dysfunctional.

[skhunted]

I think you are missing the big picture. This ruling is setting the stage for a new regulatory regime. The lower courts see where this Supreme Court is going and they are going to overturn any regulatory ruling that has any semblance of ambiguity in the underlying law. What matters is the direction the court is going and what it is signaling with this ruling.

[anticensor]

By the way, requirement of minimising ambiguity, and explicit limitation of delegation are not specific to the US. High courts of many other countries enforce this very standard.

[mike_hearn]

This ruling doesn't say courts have to overturn decisions based in ambiguous law, it says the courts have to make up their own mind about the decision. That decision may also be that they agree with the agency interpretation and choosing to uphold it.

[bumby]

>Because ambiguous rules would have to be decided on anyway

I think the implication by the OP was that they would now have to be decide by the court instead of by the executive branch agencies. Previously, those agency decisions could be brought to the court, but they didn't have to for an interpretation. That seems like a subtle but important nuance.

[gnicholas]

It won't affect caseload so much as it will affect the balance of power in settlement negotiations. Source: I used to be a lawyer who worked in a heavily regulated field.

[ZoomerCretin]

The constitution very explicitly grants Congress the right to strip jurisdiction from the federal courts.

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S2-C2-...

[mike_hearn]

But they apparently haven't done so, unless you know of a law that supercedes the APA the court is citing?

[enragedcacti]

"If you accept the majority opinion at face value, then the majority opinion sure does make a lot of sense!"