No, that isn’t the case. It is saying that regulatory agencies cannot exceed their authority and act like the judicial branch. In other words, it was the executive branch that had taken more power previously.
> It is saying that regulatory agencies cannot exceed their authority and act like the judicial branch.
On any given matter there are, at first, no laws on a given subject. Before airplanes were invented there were no rules or regulations for airplanes (FAA); similarly, pre-radio, nothing about how to use EM fields (FCC).
Now, The (US) People gave The Congress authority to make laws on any subject (limited only by the Constitution).
Congress said we will make laws limited actions on Topic X, and when non-prohibited actions are done they must be done in certain ways as prescribed by regulations. Congress further said that they cannot, ahead of time, know every situation that might arise on Topic X, but further rules may be needed.
So Congress delegated further rule making, beyond the 'base' An Act to Regulate Topic X, to an agency that Congress itself created and funded via the above Act.
An agency only exists because it was created by Congress; it only runs because it is funded by Congress. Congress says, in particular Acts, that some agency should look after the details of Topic X so Congress does not have it.
Regulatory agencies have (limited) authority because it was given to them by The People (through their elected representatives).
Couldnt they just do this formally? Afaict scotus didnt rule it's unconstitutional for congress to explicitly defer, but the derefence, which originated in court precedent, isn't good.
Theres nothing stoping congress from explictly defering either via act or in the act. Right?
All this says is that if Congress defers something to a branch, and there is ambiguity, and it comes in front of a judge, the judge does NOT have to accept the branch's interpretation of the ambiguity, and can instead judge it as judges do.
Chevron said that if the branch had a reasonable interpretation (e.g, not batshit insane like saying "no arsenic in water" means "at least ten pounds per gallon of arsenic in water") then the judge should defer to it. Now the judge can but does not have to defer to it - if he pushes back, Congress can clarify the law.
This has been done many times in the IRS, where people find a "loophole", the IRS tries to patch it themselves, the courts say, yeah, nah, and then Congress amends the law to remove it.
> All this says is that if Congress defers something to a branch, and there is ambiguity, and it comes in front of a judge, the judge does NOT have to accept the branch's interpretation of the ambiguity, and can instead judge it as judges do.
So the Judicial branch has now taken on the task of determining policy, contra what was said in Chevron:
> When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
So if Congress makes something explicit it is a policy by The People (through their elected representatives), and if there's some ambiguity it might be done purposefully by The People's representatives (Congress), with the explicit and implicit idea to have an agency deal with it. The agency is run by The People's Executive choice (President) or administrators (Secretary, Director, etc) agreeable to The People's representatives (via confirmation hearings).
It isn't simple. The judgement states that broad implied deference to the agency of the act in question, per Chevron, is incorrect and the courts decide in the those case.
There were a ton of arguments that interpretation, in general, is an Article 3 right of the courts. Though, I'd assume if congress explicitly granted interpretation to the specific agency of the act, we'd have a separate case on whether they're allowed to do that (explicitly defer).
A textualist interpretation would be that indeed congress is now stopped from that, as anything that isn't described without doubt in an act of congress is now up to court to decide, not delegated agency.
Not "taken". It was inherently granted by Congress on the joint understanding that the intent was that agencies would engage in rule making to decide areas left undefined within the scope of the law as written.
Regulatory agencies are responsible to Congress, the Legislative Branch that has the power to adjust the law to reflect its intent. Judges are not. The understanding is that it is the agencies that are intended to have the best understanding of what they regulate, not judges.
Laws were written with this assumption in place, which the Court has just rug-pulled from the operation of the US government.
What Chevron said was that when the legislative branch gives an agency power to do X and there is some disagreement between the agency and someone else over precisely what X means and the agency's interpretation is reasonable the courts should use the agency's interpretation.
> In other words, it was the executive branch that had taken more power previously.
If I may disagree: it was the legislature that gave the executive branch power, and the judicial branch that essentially approved such an arrangement (unanimously) in the original Chevron ruling.
> If I may disagree: it was the legislature that gave the executive branch power, and the judicial branch that essentially approved such an arrangement (unanimously) in the original Chevron ruling.
But the only way to properly do that is a constitutional amendment.
To give an extreme though-experiment example: Lets say Congress 1) packed the Supreme Court with yes-men, 2) passed law giving themselves a huge pay raise and delegating all legislative powers to the President, while they go party. Didn't it just create a a king/dictator? Wouldn't that be unconstitutional?
> But the only way to properly do that is a constitutional amendment.
A constitutional amendment make it permanent, but Congress never actually lost control. They always had the power - and still do - amend, restrain, clarify their own laws.
> Didn't it just create a a king/dictator? Wouldn't that be unconstitutional?
In a scenario with a packed Supreme Court of "yes men" there are no bounds to what could happen, so why bother with the thought experiment? In your example, the constitution is already worthless.
On any given matter there are, at first, no laws on a given subject. Before airplanes were invented there were no rules or regulations for airplanes (FAA); similarly, pre-radio, nothing about how to use EM fields (FCC).
Now, The (US) People gave The Congress authority to make laws on any subject (limited only by the Constitution).
Congress said we will make laws limited actions on Topic X, and when non-prohibited actions are done they must be done in certain ways as prescribed by regulations. Congress further said that they cannot, ahead of time, know every situation that might arise on Topic X, but further rules may be needed.
So Congress delegated further rule making, beyond the 'base' An Act to Regulate Topic X, to an agency that Congress itself created and funded via the above Act.
An agency only exists because it was created by Congress; it only runs because it is funded by Congress. Congress says, in particular Acts, that some agency should look after the details of Topic X so Congress does not have it.
Regulatory agencies have (limited) authority because it was given to them by The People (through their elected representatives).