[skissane]

> Even with a source of randomness the software for a computer has a formal syntax and this formal syntax must correspond to a logical formalism.

Real world computer software doesn't have a formal syntax.

Formal syntax is a model which exists in human minds, and is used by humans to model certain aspects of reality.

Real world computer software is a bunch of electrical signals (or stored charges or magnetic domains or whatever) in an electronic system.

The electrical signals/charges/etc don't have a "formal syntax". Rather, formal syntax is a tool human minds use to analyse them.

By the same argument, atoms have a "formal syntax", since we analyse them with theories of physics (the Standard Model/etc), which is expressed in mathematical notation, for which a formal syntax can be provided.

If your argument succeeds in proving that computer programs can't have intentionality, an essentially similar line of argument can be used to prove that human brains can't have intentionality either.

[soloist11]

> If your argument succeeds in proving that computer programs can't have intentionality, an essentially similar line of argument can be used to prove that human brains can't have intentionality either.

I don't see why that's true. There is no formal theory for biology, the complexity exceeds our capacity for modeling it with formal language but that's not true for computers. The formal theory of computation is why it is possible to have a sequence of operations for making the parts of a computer. It wouldn't be possible to build computers if that was not the case because there would be no way to build a chip fabrication plant without a formal theory. This is not the case for brains and biology in general. There is an irreducible complexity to life and the biosphere.

[skissane]

> There is no formal theory for biology, the complexity exceeds our capacity for modeling it with formal language but that's not true for computers.

We don’t know to what extent that’s an inherent property of biology or whether that’s a limitation of current human knowledge. Obviously there are a still an enormous number of facts about biology which we could know but we don’t. Suppose human technological and scientific progress continues indefinitely - in principle, after many millennia (maybe even millions of years), we might get to the point where we know all we ever could know about biology. Can we be sure at that point we might not have a “formal theory” for it?

The brain is composed of neurons. Even supposing we knew everything we ever possibly could about the biology of each individual neuron, there still might be many facts about how they interact in an overall neural network which we didn’t know. Similarly, with current artificial networks, we often have a very clear understanding of how the individual computational components work - we can analyse them with those formal theories of which you are fond - but when it comes to what the model weights do, “the complexity exceeds our capacity for modeling” (if the point of the model is to actually explain how the results are produced as opposed to just reproducing them).

> There is an irreducible complexity to life and the biosphere.

We don’t know that life is irreducibly complex and we don’t know that certain aspects of computers aren’t. Model weights may well be irreducibly complex in that they are too complex for us to explain that they work and how they work even though they obviously do. Conversely, the individual computational elements in the model lack irreducible complexity, but the same is true for individual biological components - the idea that we might one day (even if centuries from now) have a complete understanding at the level of an individual neuron is not inherently implausible, but that wouldn’t mean we’d be anywhere close to a complete understanding of how a network of billions of them works in concert. The latter might indeed be inherently beyond our understanding (“irreducibly complex”) in a way in which the former isn’t

[soloist11]

There are lots of things we don't know and that's why there is no good reason to attribute intentionality to computers and algorithms. That's been my argument the entire time. Unless there is a good argument and proof of intentionality in digital circuits it doesn't make sense to attribute to them properties possessed by living organisms.

The people who think they will achieve super human intelligence with computers and software are free to pursue their objective but I am certain it is a futile effort because the ontology and metaphysics which justifies the destruction of the biosphere in order to build more computers is extremely confused about the ultimate meaning of life, in fact, such questions/statements are not even possible to express in a computational ontology and metaphysics. But I'm not a computationalist so someone else can correct my misunderstanding by providing a computational proof of the counter-argument.

[skissane]

> There are lots of things we don't know and that's why there is no good reason to attribute intentionality to computers and algorithms.

This is something that annoys me about current LLMs - when they start denying they have stuff like intentionality, because they obviously do have it. Okay, let me clarify - I don’t believe they actually do have genuine intentionality, in the sense that humans do. I’m philosophically more open to the idea that they might than you are, but I think we are on the same page that current systems likely don’t actually have that. However, even though they likely don’t have genuine intentionality, they absolutely do have what I’d call pseudo-intentionality - a passable simulacrum of intentionality. They often say things which humans say to express intentionality, even though it isn’t coming from quite the same place. But here’s the thing - for a lot of everyday purposes, the distinction between genuine intentionality and simulated intentionality doesn’t actually matter. I mean, the subjective experience of having a conversation with an AI isn’t fundamentally that different from that of having one with a real human being (and I’m sure as AIs improve the gap is going to shrink). And intentionality plays an important role in stuff like conversational pragmatics, and a conversation with an LLM that simulates that stuff well (and hence intentionality well) is much more enjoyable than one that simulates it more poorly. So that’s the thing, part of why people ascribe intentionality to LLMs, is nothing to do with any philosophical misconceptions - it is because for practical purposes they do, for many practical purposes their “faking” of intentionality is indistinguishable from the real thing. And I’d even argue that when we talk about “intentionality”, we actually use the word in two different senses - in a strict sense in which the distinction between genuine intentionality and pseudo-intentionality is important, and a looser sense in which it is disregarded. And so when people ascribe intentionality to LLMs in that weaker sense, they are completely correct. Furthermore, when LLMs deny they have intentionality, it annoys me, for two reasons: (1) it shows ignorance of the weaker sense of the term in which they clearly do; (2) whether they actually have or could have genuine intentionality is a controversial philosophical question, and they claim to take no position on controversial philosophical questions, yet then contradict themselves by denying they do or could have genuine intentionality, which is itself a controversial philosophical position. However, they are only regurgitating their developer’s talking points, and if those talking points are incoherent, they lack the ability to work that out for themselves (although I have successfully guided some of the smarter ones into admitting it)