Lying is intentional, algorithms and computers do not have intentions. People can lie, computers can only execute their programmed instructions. Much of AI discourse is extremely confusing and confused because people keep attributing needs and intentions to computers and algorithms.
The social media gurus don't help with these issues by claiming that non-intentional objects are going to cause humanity's demise when there are much more pertinent issues to be concerned about like global warming, corporate malfeasance, and the general plundering of the biosphere. Algorithms that lie are not even in the top 100 list of things that people should be concerned about.
> Lying is intentional, algorithms and computers do not have intentions. People can lie, computers can only execute their programmed instructions. Much of AI discourse is extremely confusing and confused because people keep attributing needs and intentions to computers and algorithms.
How do you know whether something has “intentions”? How can you know that humans have them but computer programs (including LLMs) don’t or can’t?
If one is a materialist/physicalist, one has to say that human intentions (assuming one agrees they exist, contra eliminativism) have to be reducible to or emergent from physical processes in the brain. If intentions can be reducible to/emergent from physical processes in the brain, why can’t they also be reducible to/emergent from a computer program, which is also ultimately a physical process (calculations on a CPU/GPU/etc)?
What if one is a non-materialist/non-physicalist? I don’t think that makes the question any easier to answer. For example, a substance dualist will insist that intentionality is inherently immaterial, and hence requires an immaterial soul. And yet, if one believes that, one has to say those immaterial souls somehow get attached to material human brains - why couldn’t one then be attached to an LLM (or the physical hardware it executes on), hence giving it the same intentionality that humans have?
I think this is one of those questions where if someone thinks the answer is obvious, that’s a sign they likely know far less about the topic than they think they do.
You're using circular logic. You are assuming all physical processes are computational and then concluding that the brain is a computer even though that's exactly what you assumed to begin with. I don't find this argument convincing because I don't think that everything in the universe is a computer or a computation. The computational assumption is a totalizing ontology and metaphysics which leaves no room for further progress other than the construction of larger data centers and faster computers.
> You're using circular logic. You are assuming all physical processes are computational and then concluding that the brain is a computer even though that's exactly what you assumed to begin with.
No, I never assumed “all physical processes are computational”. I never said that in my comment and nothing I said in my comment relies on such an assumption.
What I’m claiming is (1) we lack consensus on what “intentionality” is (2) we lack consensus on how we can determine whether something has it. Neither claim depends on any assumptions about “physical processes are computational”
If one assumes materialism/physicalism - and I personally don’t, but given most people do, I’ll assume it for the sake of the argument - intentionality must ultimately be physical. But I never said it must ultimately be computational. Computers are also (assuming physicalism) ultimately physical, so if both human brains and computers are ultimately physical, if the former have (ultimately physical) intentionality - why can’t the latter? That argument hinges on the idea both brains and computers are ultimately physical, not on any claim that the physical is computational.
Suppose, hypothetically, that intentionality while ultimately physical, involves some extra-special quantum mechanical process - as suggested by Penrose and Hameroff’s extremely controversial and speculative “orchestrated objective reduction” theory [0]. Well, in that case, a program/LLM running on a classical computer couldn’t have intentionality, but maybe one running on a quantum computer could, depending on exactly how this “extra-special quantum mechanical process” works. Maybe, a standard quantum computer would lack the “extra-special” part, but one could design a special kind of quantum computer that did have it.
But, my point is, we don’t actually know whether that theory is true or false. I think the majority of expert opinion in relevant disciplines doubts it is true, but nobody claims to be able to disprove it. In its current form, it is too vague to be disproven.
Intentions are not reducible to computational implementation because intentions are not algorithms that can be implemented with digital circuits. What can be implemented with computers and digital circuits are deterministic signal processors which always produce consistent outputs for indistinguishable inputs.
You seem to be saying that because we have no clear cut way of determining whether people have intentions then that means, by physical reductionism, algorithms could also have intentions. The limiting case of this kind of semantic hair splitting is that I can say this about anything. There is no way to determine if something is dead or alive, there is no definition that works in all cases and no test to determine whether something is truly dead or alive so it must be the case that algorithms might or might not be alive but because we can't tell then me might as well assume there will be a way to make algorithms that are alive.
It's possible to reach any nonsensical conclusion using your logic because I can always ask for a more stringent definition and a way to test whether some object or attribute satisfies all the requirements.
I don't know anything about theories of consciousness but that's another example of something which does not have an algorithmic implementation unless one uses circular logic and assumes that the brain is a computer and consciousness is just software.
> Intentions are not reducible to computational implementation because intentions are not algorithms that can be implemented with digital circuits.
What is an "intention"? Do we all agree on what it even is?
> What can be implemented with computers and digital circuits are deterministic signal processors which always produce consistent outputs for indistinguishable inputs.
We don't actually know whether humans are ultimately deterministic or not. It is exceedingly difficult, even impossible, to distinguish the apparent indeterminism of a sufficiently complex/chaotic deterministic system, from genuinely irreducible indeterminism. It is often assumed that classical systems have merely apparent indeterminism (pseudorandomness) whereas quantum systems have genuine indeterminism (true randomness), but we don't actually know that for sure – if many-worlds or hidden variables are true, then quantum indeterminism is ultimately deterministic too. Orchestrated objective reduction (OOR) assumes that QM is ultimately indeterministic, and there is some neuronal mechanism (microtubules are commonly suggested) which permits this quantum indeterminism to influence the operations of the brain.
However, if you provide your computer with a quantum noise input, then whether the results of computations relying on that noise input are deterministic depends on whether quantum randomness itself is deterministic. So, if OOR is correct in claiming that QM is ultimately indeterministic, and quantum indeterminism plays an important role in human intentionality, why couldn't an LLM sampled using a quantum random number generator also have that same intentionality?
> You seem to be saying that because we have no clear cut way of determining whether people have intentions then that means, by physical reductionism, algorithms could also have intentions.
Personally, I'm a subjective idealist, who believes that intentionality is an irreducible aspect of reality. So no, I don't believe in physical reductionism, nor do I believe that algorithms can have intentions by way of physical reductionism.
However, while I personally believe that subjective idealism is true, it is an extremely controversial philosophical position, which the clear majority of people reject (at least in the contemporary West) – so I can't claim "we know" it is true. Which is my whole point – we, collectively speaking, don't know much at all about intentionality, because we lack the consensus on what it is and what determines whether it is present.
> The limiting case of this kind of semantic hair splitting is that I can say this about anything. There is no way to determine if something is dead or alive, there is no definition that works in all cases and no test to determine whether something is truly dead or alive so it must be the case that algorithms might or might not be alive.
We have a reasonably clear consensus that animals and plants are alive, whereas ore deposits are not. (Although ore deposits, at least on Earth, may contain microscopic life–but the question is whether the ore deposit in itself is alive, as opposed being the home of lifeforms which are distinct from it.) However, there is genuine debate among biologists about whether viruses and prions should be classified as alive, not alive, or in some intermediate category. And more speculatively, there is also semantic debate about whether ecosystems are alive (as a kind of superorganism which is a living being beyond the mere sum of the individual life of each of its members) and also about whether artificial life is possible (and if so, how to determine whether any putative case of artificial life actually is alive or not). So, I think alive-vs-dead is actually rather similar to the question of intentionality – most people agree humans and at least some animals have intentionality, most people would agree that ore deposits don't, but other questions are much more disputed (e.g. could AIs have intentionality? do plants have intentionality?)
LLMs are incapable of presenting things as truth.