[CyberScarecrow]

Author of cyber scarecrow here. Thank you for your feedback, and you are 100% right. We also dont have a code signing certificate yet either, they are expensive for windows. Smartscreen also triggers when you install it. Id be weary of installing it myself as well, especially considering it runs as admin, to be able to create the fake indicators.

I have just added a bit of info about us on the website. I'm not sure what else we can do really. Its a trust thing, same with any software and AV vendors.

[yamakadi]

I’m sure it’s closed source for the eventual plans to monetize it, but what’s the real difference to something like https://github.com/NavyTitanium/Fake-Sandbox-Artifacts and why can’t you at least name yourselves?

Not many software promises to fend off attackers, asks for an email address before download, and creates a bunch of processes using a closed source dll the existence of which can easily be checked.

Then again, not many malware targeting consumers at random check for security software. You are more likely to see a malware stop working if you fake the amount of ram and cpu and your network driver vendor than if you have CrowdStrike, etc. running.

[mistercheph]

I am pretty sure this is just malware being upvoted with sockpuppet accounts, I'm surprised it hasn't been flagged.

[flexagoon]

Are you talking about this GitHub script or the Scarecrow app?

[maronato]

The closed source one that asks for your email and has very little information about its developers.

[patcon]

agreed

[rft]

Concerning code signing: Azure has a somewhat new offering that allows you to sign code for Windows (SmartScreen compatible) without having an EV cert. It is called "Trusted Signing" [1], non-marketing docs [2]. The major gotcha is that currently you need to have a company or similar entity 3 years or older to get public trust. I tried it with a company younger than 3 years and was denied. You might have a company that fits that criteria or you might get lucky.

The major upside is the pricing: currently "free" [3] during testing, later about 10 USD/month. As there doesn't seem to be a revocation mechanism based on some docs I read, signed binaries might be valid even after a canceled subscription.

[1] https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/trusted-signing

[2] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/trusted-signing/quic...

[3] You need a CC and they will likely charge you at some point. Also I had to use some kind of business Azure/MS 365 account which costs about 5 USD/month. Not sure about the exact lingo, not an Azure/MS expert. The docs in [2] was enough for me to get through the process.

[Tepix]

So $10+$5 per month versus $195 per year?

That's not a big discount.

[roblabla]

Where'd you get $195/yr? EV certs are usually around $400/yr last I checked. In that sense, $10+$5/mo is a _huge_ discount.

[bzmrgonz]

Don't you know.. microsoft doesn't believe in discounts. The evil-empire runs a taxing system envied by the IRS itself. Entire industries have gone up in arms complaining that M$ cloud price structure doesn't allow for third party margins and still they hold strong to their price structure.

[jagged-chisel]

64% is indeed a hefty discount

[jonplackett]

I have no idea of the costs but I am confused where that percentage came from. It doesn’t match anything not the parent comment.

[jrflowers]

What percentage of 195 is 70?

[evanelias]

$70 isn't correct though. The cost was originally described upthread as ($10 per month) + ($5 per month), not ($10 per year) + ($5 per month).

That said, EV certs jumped in price over the past couple years. The total cost ends up being higher than the list price -- vendors tack on a non-trivial extra fee for the USB hardware token and shipping. All-inclusive I paid like $450 a year ago, and that was after getting a small repeat-customer discount.

So yes, Azure's service is substantially cheaper than an EV cert. And it also has the flexibility of being a monthly plan, rather than an annual commitment.

[peter_l_downs]

One more thing you could do is put the real name of any human being with any track record of professionalism, anywhere on the website. Currently you're:

- commenting under a pseudonymous profile

- asking for emails by saying "please email me. contact at cyberscarecrow.com"

- describing yourself in your FAQ entry for "Who are you?" by writing "We are cyber security researchers, living in the UK. We built cyber scarecrow to run on our own computers and decided to share it for others to use it too."

I frequently use pseudonymous profiles for various things but they are NOT a good way to establish trust.

[bryant]

It's a neat concept, although I imagine this'll be a cat and mouse endeavor that escalates very quickly. So, a suggestion - apply to the Open Technology Fund's Rapid Response Fund. I'd probably request the following in your position:

* code signing certificate funding

* consulting/assessment to harden the application or concept itself as well as to make it more robust (they'll probably route through Cure53)

* consulting/engineering to solve for the "malware detects this executable and decides that the other indicators can be ignored" problem, or consulting more generally on how to do this in a way that's more resilient.

If you wanted to fund this in some way without necessarily doing the typical founder slog, might make sense to 501c3 in the US and then get funded by or license this to security tooling manufacturers so that it can be embedded into security tools, or to research the model with funding from across the security industry so that the allergic reaction by malware groups to security tooling can be exploited more systemically.

I imagine the final state of this effort might be that security companies could be willing to license decoy versions of their toolkits to everyone that are bitwise identical to actual running versions but then activate production functionality with the right key.

[sangnoir]

> consulting/engineering to solve for the "malware detects this executable and decides that the other indicators can be ignored" problem, or consulting more generally on how to do this in a way that's more resilient.

This would be a boon for security folk who analyze/reverse malware: they can add/simulate this tool in their VMs to ensure the malware being analyzed doesn't deactivate itself!

[CodeWriter23]

> decoy versions of their toolkits to everyone that are bitwise identical to actual running versions but then activate production functionality with the right key

I kinda think this functionality could be subverted into a kill switch for legit-licensed installs simply by altering the key.

[eganist]

I mean, the existing licensing mechanisms can be similarly abused.

[kiney]

Not very convincing tbh. Theres's no source code and no real name or company on the website...

[px43]

Obviously this should be an open source tool that people can build for themselves. If you want to sell premium services or upgrades for it later, you need to have an open/free tier as well.

Also are you aware of the (very awesome) EDR evasion toolkit called scarecrow? Naming stuff is hard, I get that, but this collision is a bit much IMO.

https://github.com/Tylous/ScareCrow

[AnthonyMouse]

> We also dont have a code signing certificate yet either, they are expensive for windows.

When someone is offering you a certificate and the only thing you have to do in order to get it is pay them a significant amount of money, that's a major red flag that it's either a scam or you're being extorted. Or both. In any case you should not pay them and neither should anyone else.

[DougN7]

Besides paying money you also go through a (pretty simplistic) audit. It’s about the only way we have to know who published some code, which is important. If you can come up with a better way you should implement it and we’ll all follow.

As a side note, I’ve been trying to figure out how to get an EV code signing cert that isn’t tied to me (want to make a tool Microsoft won’t like and don’t want retaliation to hurt my business) but I haven’t come up with a way to do it - which is a good thing I suppose.

[hunter2_]

Can you have someone else go through the process of getting it, like a Craigslist rando to whom you pay cash?

[wongarsu]

If said Craigslist rando likes getting police visits and potentially being criminally liable for helping you commit a felony ...

All code signing promises to give you the name of a real person or company that signed the binary. From there it's the end user's responsibility to decide if they trust that entity.

In practice the threat of the justice system makes any signed executable unlikely to be malicious. But that doesn't mean you have to uncritically trust a binary signed by Joe Hobo

[newzisforsukas]

> In practice the threat of the justice system makes any signed executable unlikely to be malicious.

What threats are those? Where are all the people going to jail for falsely signed software? The stuxnet authors seem to be in the wind.

[wongarsu]

The threat is that if you sign malware with your name you will be quickly connected with said malware. If you don't live in a country that turns a blind eye to cyber crime that is a quick ticket to jail.

Of course people stealing other people's signing keys is an issue. But EV code signing certificates are pretty well protected (requiring either a hardware dongle or 2FA). It's not impossible for a highly sophisticated attacker, but it's a pretty high bar.

[hluska]

There’s an audit to go through where you (sort of) prove who you are. The system isn’t great, but if you can come up with something better there’s a lot of space to make software more secure for people.

[firesteelrain]

There's a reason it costs money and it's because the CAs have to undergo costly audits. Microsoft publishes a list of trusted CAs:

https://ccadb.my.salesforce-sites.com/microsoft/IncludedCACe...

[a1o]

This looks like a random website and not a Microsoft website. How could I trust such list?

[firesteelrain]

Because it came from this site: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/part...

I used Google to search for "list of microsoft trusted CA".

[firesteelrain]

Looks like people have no experience with CA audits or security controls

[housebear]

Where is that additional info? It just says you're a group of security researchers, but there are no names, no verifiable credentials, nothing. You haven't really added any info that would contribute to any real trust.

[archon810]

Exactly. This continues to tell us absolutely nothing.

"Who are you?

We are cyber security researchers, living in the UK. We built cyber scarecrow to run on our own computers and decided to share it for others to use it too."

[efilife]

It ceases to be a trust thing once you open source the code

[wongarsu]

In a world where everybody builds from source or downloads from a trusted build service

[shadowgovt]

... and trusts their entire toolchain hasn't been compromised.

[Z7YCx5ieof4Std]

Is it possible to fake being from Russia. I heard some malware won't install on computers from Russia or with the Russian language as primary language

[n2d4]

This can have the opposite effect too: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/03/sabot...

[DougN7]

Or has the Russian keyboard installed, even if not used IIRC.

[kozak]

And be targeted by cyberwarfare from the first-world side.

[CyberScarecrow]

Great idea. Looking at installing an additional keyboard or language with out it being anoying to the user is next on the feature list.

[llama_drama]

This might be not a good idea. There are some reports of malware (npm packages, iirc) specifically targeting russian computers since the invasion

[whaleofatw2022]

Russia has serious penalties for hacking their citizens.

Not for hacking non citizens

[hyperific]

Something that would have built trust with me that I didn't find on the site was any mention of success rate. Surely CyberScarecrow has been tested against known malware to see if the process successfully thwarts an attack.

[IncognitoEntity]

I'd suggest putting down the actual authors. If you're UK based there should really be no issue in putting down each of the people involved and what their background in the industry is. Otherwise this just looks like a v1 to get people interested and v2 could include malware. Tbh it'd be quite a clever ploy if it is malware. Trust isn't built blindly, most smaller software creators always have their details known. I'd suggest if you want it to pick up traction, you have a full "about us" page.

[twixfel]

There are things that you can do that make you seem trustworthy, and you've done none of them.

[notreallyauser]

You're collecting personal info and claiming to be in the UK: identifying the data controller would be a start, both for building trust and complying with GDPR.

[bzmrgonz]

How are you planning on preventing bad actors to identify scarecrow itself? You gonna randomize the name/processes etc?? Like anti-malware software do to install in stealth-mode??

[beeboobaa3]

github link? if it's not open source it's dead on arrival