| >Do you mean no way to get there within realistic computation bounds? I mean there's no well defined "there" either. It's a hand-waved notion that adding more intelligence (itself not very well defined, but let's use IQ) you get to something called "hyperintelligence", say IQ 1000 or IQ 10000, that has what can be described as magical powers, like it can convince any person to do anything, can invent things at will, huge business success, market prediction, and so on. Whether intelligence is cummulative like that, or whether having it gets you those powers (aside from the succesful high IQ people, we know many people with IQ 145+ that are not inventing stuff left and right, or convincing people with some greater charisma than the average IQ 100 or 120 politician, but e.g. are just sad MENSA losers, whose greatest achievement is their test scores). >Because if we allow for arbitrarily high (but still finite) amounts of compute, then some computable approximation of AIXI should work fine. I doubt that too. The limit for LLMs for example is more human produced training data (a hard limit) than compute. |
IQ has an issue that is inessential to the task at hand, which is how it is based on a population distribution. It doesn’t make sense for large values (unless there is a really large population satisfying properties that aren’t satisfied).
> I doubt that too. The limit for LLMs for example is more human produced training data (a hard limit) than compute.
Are you familiar with what AIXI is?
When I said “arbitrarily large”, it wasn’t for laziness reasons that I didn’t give an amount that is plausibly achievable. AIXI is kind of goofy. The full version of AIXI is uncomputable (it uses a halting oracle), which is why I referred to the computable approximations to it.
AIXI doesn’t exactly need you to give it a training set, just put it in an environment where you give it a way to select actions, and give it a sensory input signal, and a reward signal.
Then, assuming that the environment it is in is computable (which, recall, AIXI itself is not), its long-run behavior will maximize the expected (time discounted) future reward signal.
There’s a sense in which it is asymptotically optimal across computable environments (... though some have argued that this sense relies on a distribution over environments based on the enumeration of computable functions, and that this might make this property kinda trivial. Still, I’m fairly confident that it would be quite effective. I think this triviality issue is mostly a difficulty of having the right definition.)
(Though, if it was possible to implement practically, you would want to make darn sure that the most effective way for it to make its reward signal high would be for it to do good things and not either bad things or to crack open whatever system is setting the reward signal in order for it to set it itself.)
(How it works: AIXI basically enumerates through all possible computable environments, assigning initial probability to each according to the length of the program, and updating the probabilities based on the probability of that environment providing it with the sequence of perceptions and reward signals it has received so far when the agent takes the sequence of actions it has taken so far. It evaluates the expected values of discounted future reward of different combinations of future actions based on its current assigned probability of each of the environments under consideration, and selects its next action to maximize this. I think the maximum length of programs that it considers as possible environments increases over time or something, so that it doesn’t have to consider infinitely many at any particular step.)