[buildbuildbuild]

I hear you but caution against such oversimplification. Advanced Data Protection for iCloud is a thing. Our culture of cloud reliance is truly dangerous, but some vendors are at least trying to E2E data where possible.

There are big risks to having a cloud digital footprint, yet clouds can be used “somewhat securely” with encryption depending on your personal threat model.

Also, it’s not fair to compare clouds to wiretapping. Unless you are implying that Apple’s infrastructure is backdoored without their knowledge? One does not simply walk into an Apple datacenter and retrieve user data without questions asked. Legal process is required, and Apple’s legal team has one the stronger track records of standing up against broad requests.

[hu3]

iCloud end-to-end encryption is disabled by default.

So by default, user data is not protected.

https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651

[theshrike79]

Yes, because the UX is better that way.

With ADP if your mom loses her encryption keys, it's all gone. Forever. Permanently.

And of course it's Apple's fault somehow. That's why it's not the default.

[ggamecrazy]

Broadly, in the US, the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 still applies. You're going to have to convince a judge otherwise.

Yes, perhaps broad dragnet type of might be scoffed down by some judges (outside of Patriot act FISA judges ofc)

I would warn you about the general E2E encryption and encrypted at rest claims. They are in-fact correct, but perhaps misleading? At some point, for most, the data does get decrypted server-side - cue the famous ":-)"