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by dTal
740 days ago
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>robust system state attestation (both local and remote) against attackers with physical access Phrases like this give me the shivers, as it translates into "mandatory surveillance by some authority telling me what I can and can't do with my computer". TPM is an evil concept. Physical access should be final. |
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That "attestation" in the full disk encryption case means your disk encryption key only being available to the operating system you chose to install. And disallowing the ability of a laptop thief to change that.
Or remote attestation can be used to restrict access to a corporate network to corporate controlled devices only. No one surveills you, or has access to your device in this scenario either, the TPM there is used to produce a certificate of the device state that can effectively act as access credentials to a resource.
This is about recognising the fact that the person in physical possession of a device isn't necessarily the legitimate owner.