Not the only uses, but certainly all of the widespread implementations of trusted hardware just haven't been able to avoid that temptation of privileging the manufacturer while securing against the user themselves. Every little hole is another setback that keeps the designers/implementers working on this layer instead of starting to tighten the noose on the next one.
TPMs are a cryptographic coprocessor with added platform state attestation functionality. That can for example be used locally for secure secret storage that is only available in certain platform states, or remotely to certify the state of a device trying to access a corporate network.
Of course TPMs can be (ab)used for DRM, but the same property in general to many ideas in cryptography. We still don't say AES or RSA are tools designed to restrict your rights.
In reality TPMs are almost always used to (attempt to) protect the user's data over restricting them.
I would argue that the discrete chip variation of them aren't very good at this (and even less good at DRM), but a lousy implementation doesn't mean the concept is bad. (As Foxboron mentioned earlier in this thread, discrete TPMs can still act as reasonably good "discounted" SmartCards, but they are bad at platforms state attestation.)
In fact I would have much preferred if the industry embraced the measured boot idea more instead of mainly pushing stricter verified boot schemes.
Of course TPMs can be (ab)used for DRM, but the same property in general to many ideas in cryptography. We still don't say AES or RSA are tools designed to restrict your rights.
AES and RSA are just algorithms, not implementations. I'd compare TPMs to HDCP, AACS, or CSS (the DVD one) instead.