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by kn100
751 days ago
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Great read, and fantastic investigation. Also nice to see a story of some big corp not going nuclear on a security researcher. I can't say for certain, and the OP if they're here I'd love for you to validate this - but I'm not convinced requests to the local admin interface on these Nokia routers is properly authenticated. I know this because I recently was provisioned with one and found there were certain settings I could not change as a regular admin, and I was refused the super admin account by the ISP. turns out you could just inspector hack the page to undisable the fields and change the fields yourself, and the API would happily accept them. if this is the case, and an application can be running inside your network, it wouldn't be hard to compromise the router that way, but seems awfully specific! |
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That suggested to me that we shouldn't have ISPs that are this big. Cox is clearly a juicy target and a single vulnerability compromises, as an example from the article, even FBI field offices.
> After reporting the vulnerability to Cox, they investigated if the specific vector had ever been maliciously exploited in the past and found no history of abuse
Feel like author should have written "...they claimed to have investigated...".